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This booklet is about the privatization of municipal services such as water, waste and electricity in the city of Cape Town.  The term ‘privatization’ is used to cover a range of private sector activities, including outsourcing and the introduction of private 
sector principles such as performance-based management and full-cost 
recovery into service delivery reforms.  We also include the corporatization 
of services in this broad defi nition.  
Chapter One argues that there has been a fundamental shift away 
from the ‘statist’ service delivery models of the past where the state 
subsidized and delivered municipal services (albeit in a racially-biased 
manner), towards a more ‘neoliberal’ service delivery model where the 
private sector (and private sector principles) dominate.  In the latter model, 
the state acts as a service ‘ensurer’ rather than a service ‘provider’ – in 
the now-fashionable language of the World Bank – and municipal services 
are ‘run more like a business’, with fi nancial cost recovery becoming the 
most important measure of performance.  The chapter is based on extensive 
interviews with senior city managers and politicians, as well as a review of 
relevant policy documents, political party position papers and an evaluation 
of council activities since the fi rst democratic elections in 1996.   
Chapter Two provides a detailed account of the increasing 
commercialization of water in Cape Town, with a focus on current efforts 
to corporatize the service into a ringfenced business unit.  Although 
different from the outright divestiture of state assets in that the city retains 
control and ownership of water facilities, corporatization nevertheless 
raises many of the same concerns about access and affordability as 
privatization and introduces many of the same profi t-oriented motives 
and operating principles.  It is also often the fi rst step towards 
outright privatization.  This chapter provides an overview of the city’s 
water corporatization plans followed by a list of concerns as to their 
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appropriateness for Cape Town, the most important of which relate to 
issues of accountability and regulation, the continued fragmentation of 
service delivery decision making, heightened pressures for cost recovery, 
and the process by which the corporatization proposals have been 
developed.
Underlying much of this discussion is the argument that neither the 
promise nor the potential of public sector reform have been achieved in 
Cape Town.  Contrary to written guarantees on the part of the African 
National Congress (ANC) that the public sector would be the ‘preferred 
service provider’, local ANC councils have failed to adequately explore 
the public sector option and have actively promoted privatization and 
corporatization.
The other major political parties in Cape Town – the Democratic Party 
(DP) and the New National Party (NNP) – have been equally unwilling to 
explore and promote public sector reform but have been open about their 
private sector preferences.   So too have senior municipal managers, many 
of whom are responsible for the daily operation and decision making of 
service delivery in the city.  It is at this level of the civil service that the 
most concrete (albeit unoffi cial and ad hoc) expression of privatization and 
corporatization is to be found.
Our objective with this report is to document – for the fi rst time 
since the end of apartheid – both the scale and character of privatization 
initiatives in Cape Town and to situate these policy changes within the 
broader national and international policy-making environment on service 
delivery.  There are different opinions on privatization in Cape Town, and 
we attempt to capture these nuances in our analysis, but there is an 
overwhelmingly pro-privatization philosophy, representing a shift in policy 
orientation as profound as any that Cape Town has experienced in its long 
and tumultuous history.  That this ideological shift should be discussed, and 





Privatization and the New Ideologies of 
Service Delivery
By David A McDonald
The city of Cape Town has undergone dramatic changes in the past twenty years.  From the repressive and racist apartheid planning of the early 1980s, to a gradual loosening of apartheid laws in the late 1980s, to a massive restructuring of local government into non-racial 
structures in the 1990s, Cape Town has experienced changes on a scale 
and at a pace that few cities in the world can imagine.  
Demographically, the city has witnessed a signifi cant infl ux of South 
Africans from other parts of the country (most notably from the former 
African ‘bantustans’ of the Ciskei and Transkei) and is now also 
experiencing migration from other parts of the continent.  Urban sprawl – 
both formal and informal – has changed the landscape of the metropolitan 
area dramatically, and the city has moved from 25 racially-divided 
municipalities to a single metropolitan council.  
This latter restructuring has taken place in two stages and has involved 
a massive reorganization of some 30,000 employees, the creation of 
new political units, new electoral processes and the introduction of new 
political objectives geared to poverty relief, democratic representation and 
participatory decision making.  Untold numbers of person-hours have gone 
into the planning and implementation of this political and organizational 
restructuring of the city.  
These organizational changes have been the subject of considerable 
political and public debate in Cape Town and many of these changes – 
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particularly new boundaries and the formation of a single metropolitan 
‘unicity’ – have been hotly contested.  Although still confusing to many in 
terms of the practical implications of these organizational changes, the fact 
that a single, non-racial metropolitan government now exists in Cape Town 
is common knowledge in the city and is well documented in the press and 
in government archives.  
Much less well documented are the changes that have taken place 
in policy orientation in the newly restructured city – particularly with 
respect to the delivery of basic municipal services such as water, electricity, 
sewerage and sanitation.  Gone are the days of race-based planning and 
discrimination where the needs of white Capetonians were given clear and 
explicit preference over the needs of black South Africans, but what are the 
new models of service delivery?  How does Cape Town fulfi ll its promise 
to be a city that “works for all”?  
The purpose of this chapter is to document – for the fi rst time since the 
end of apartheid – the ideological orientation of service delivery policies 
in metropolitan Cape Town.  Based on interviews with senior municipal 
bureaucrats and politicians from a range of municipal areas and service 
departments, as well as a close reading of policy documents, planning 
papers and election manifestos of the key parties contesting the recent 
local government elections, this chapter offers a comprehensive overview 
of both the scale and character of policy shifts in the city since the fi rst 
post-apartheid local government elections in 1996. 
There has been a signifi cant paradigmatic shift in policy orientation over 
the past fi ve years, from that of a state-funded and state-run service delivery 
model to one that can be best described as ‘neoliberal’ – defi ned here 
by policies that are market-oriented in nature, such as full-cost recovery, 
corporatization and privatization.  Rather than being seen as a service 
‘provider’, local government in Cape Town is increasingly being seen as a 
service ‘ensurer’, overseeing and regulating service delivery by the private 
sector or by creating stand-alone ‘corporate units’.  In short, running the 
city more like a business. 
Interestingly, this is true of both old-guard apartheid bureaucrats 
and politicians who were once steeped in the statist model of service 
delivery (albeit biased towards whites) as well as new African National 
Congress (ANC) – allied councillors and bureaucrats for whom a statist/
socialist model of poverty reduction and service delivery were long-
time party positions.  
The chapter begins with a summary of interviews with senior decision 
5
Privatization and the New Ideologies of Service Delivery 
makers in the Cape metro area, followed by an examination of policy 
documents and election platforms of the key parties contesting local 
government seats.  It then looks at the track record of local government 
in Cape Town since 1996 and highlights what has been an ad hoc, but 
nevertheless very real and widespread, privatization of municipal services 
over the past fi ve years.  
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the broader political and 
economic forces shaping local government decision making in Cape Town 
with respect to service delivery and asks whether alternative policy choices 
are available.  It is argued that policy alternatives do exist and that the 
space for choice is considerable.  
Talking Privatization: Interviews with Senior 
Decision Makers
Our analysis of decision makers in the Cape Metropolitan Area (CMA) is based on interviews with 61 municipal managers and politicians over a three-month period from June to August 2000.  Three groups of interviews were completed: 
senior-level management (30 interviews); mid-level management (18 
interviews); and elected councillors (13 interviews).  Managers were drawn 
randomly from a list of what were considered to be 120 of the most 
important service delivery decision-making positions.  Many of these 
managers were from engineering departments but interviews were also 
conducted with managers from planning, fi nance, housing and other 
relevant sectors.  
Efforts were made to interview all executive-level managers in the six 
municipal substructures and the one metropolitan authority that made 
up the interim local government from 1996 – 2000 (e.g., CEOs and 
Executive Directors).  The substructures of Cape Town and Tygerberg were 
the largest municipal authorities in this interim government structure and 
therefore provided the largest number of interviewees, with a total of 21 
out of 61 interviews.  
Councillors were selected on a similar basis, with interviews being 
sought with the most senior and infl uential politicians from each of the 
parties in power in the metropolitan area (the African National Congress 
(ANC), the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Party (DP)).  For 
purposes of confi dentiality, the names and positions of interviewees are not 
mentioned in this report.
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The interviews were semi-structured questionnaires which focused on four 
themes of municipal restructuring in Cape Town: 1) the redistribution of 
public services since 1996; 2) preferences for private versus public sector 
service delivery options; 3) the degree to which public participation has 
occurred in decision making; and 4) perceptions of what it means to be a 
‘world class’ city.  The second of these themes is the primary focus here. 
It should be noted that some important political changes have taken 
place since these interviews – most notably the fi ring of ANC-allied 
members of the Executive Management team of the former Cape Town City 
Council by the NNP-DP coalition that won the local government elections 
in December 2000, as well as the splits within the NNP-DP coalition itself 
in late 2001.  However, the majority of those interviewed for this research 
remain in offi ce.  More importantly, there has been no discernable shift 
in policy orientation by any of the major political parties or within the 
civil service.  Indeed, neoliberal ideology with respect to service delivery 
would appear to be so hegemonic in the city that no amount of political 
gerrymandering at the municipal level would alter the underlying pro-
privatization philosophy described here.
Attitudes Towards Privatization
When asked a series of questions about whether municipal services in the 
new unicity should be delivered by the public sector or by the private 
sector (and why), there were two broad categories of responses.  One 
group of managers/councillors took a very pro-privatization approach – 
what will be referred to here as the ‘bullish’ approach to privatization.  This 
group felt that the public sector is simply incapable of providing services 
on a sustainable basis and made calls for rapid and widespread private 
sector involvement.  The second group took a more careful – or, more 
accurately, ‘cautious’ – approach to privatization.  
Nevertheless, both groups were strong proponents of increased private 
sector participation in service delivery, with only four of the 61 managers 
and councillors interviewed being opposed to increased private sector 
participation.  Twenty-fi ve interviewees (41%) fell into the ‘cautious’ 
category, while 32 (53%) fell into the ‘bullish’ category.  Interestingly, only 
one of the councillors interviewed could be classifi ed as ‘cautious’, while 
nine were ‘bullish’ and three were opposed to privatization.  Middle and 
senior managers were more or less split between cautious and bullish 
positions (with only one manager opposed to privatization).  Table 1 
provides a breakdown of these responses.1
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Table 1: Attitudes of Managers and Councillors Towards 
Increased Privatization of Municipal Services in Cape Town 
The ‘Cautious’ Respondents
One area that differentiated the cautious group from their more 
bullish counterparts was a concern about ‘core’ services such as water, 
sanitation, electricity and waste.  The cautious respondents saw these 
as intrinsically public in nature and needing to be provided by local 
government.  One manager, for example, argued that “government is 
better at providing emergency services and sewerage, which is a highly 
integrated service and where the risk for a contractor is too high”.  He 
added that the public sector has better knowledge of these key services 
due to its long history of running them.  Another manager commented 
that, “The result of privatizing an area like sewerage to the private sector 
is that if payment isn’t received, you will end up seeing sewerage running 
down the street”. 
There was also a general sense amongst the cautious group of 
respondents that government should remain in charge of services that 
are highly subsidized, such as libraries, clinics, community halls and 
swimming pools, where “customers are unable to pay the full economic 
value of running services”.  This concern refl ected a broader apprehension 
about how privatizing highly subsidized services might affect the capacity 
to cross-subsidize services in low-income communities.  One manager 
highlighted these equity considerations by saying: “If poor people can’t pay 
for a service...local government can arrange for fl exible forms of payment.  
The private sector isn’t fl exible when it comes to payment”.
’suoituaC‘ ’hsilluB‘ desoppO
roineS
sreganam 61 31 1
elddiM
sreganam 8 01 0
srollicnuoC 1 9 3
SLATOT 52 23 4
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Tradeable services such as electricity, water, wastewater and solid waste 
are other areas for which the cautious interviewees noted some concerns.  
These services form a signifi cant portion of local government revenue in 
the CMA (combined tariffs and charges making up more than 12% of 
revenues) while some services contribute to the general rates accounts 
and are used to cross-subsidize other municipal activities (most notably 
electricity which contributes 13% of total sales to general revenues) (PWC 
2001, 7, 17).  Noting the importance of these services, one ‘cautious’ 
senior manager noted that:
We need to qualify outsourcing.  In some services such as water and 
electricity, signifi cant sources of income come back to the coffers of 
local government and help to cross-subsidize these services.  If there 
were no income stream coming in, government would have to raise 
rates.  An important judgement call has to be made when deciding 
to privatize.
Revenue generating services were therefore identifi ed as areas of service 
delivery that local government should remain involved in, the underlying 
motivation being to ensure that those who cannot afford to pay the full cost 
of collectively consumed goods could still gain access to them through 
local government cross-subsidization.  
Another area that differentiated the ‘cautious’ group from the ‘bullish’ 
group was the issue of context.  Cautious respondents said that that there 
should be no generic privatization blueprint for the city of Cape Town, 
arguing instead for public-private partnership (PPP) packages that met the 
existing capacities, backlogs and resources of a given community.  Others 
went as far as to argue for the need to better evaluate public sector capacity 
before considering public-private ventures.  According to one manager: 
We need to reassess the private-public partnership and tailor public 
services with particular needs at particular localities.  We need to 
ask if public resources match a given package for an area and what 
other resources are available in this area to help boost the funding 
for this defi ned package.  We need to look at other public resources 
for redistribution within districts.  Getting district information on needs 
and resources in a given area can help with this process.  When 
this approach is institutionalized local government can have a greater 
assessment of localized investment.
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A fi nal area of concern was the issue of integrating what remains a highly 
fragmented and inequitable system of service delivery in the metropolitan 
area.  According to one senior manager:
Privatization must mean taking responsibility for providing value for 
money for people who elect them.  The danger is having independent 
service providers for those who can afford to pay for a service, as this 
will thwart the critical element of integration.  [Some parts of the city] 
don’t have the in-house capacity that [the former substructure of] Cape 
Town has, the work is contracted out and becomes a piecemeal effort 
where integrated planning is lacking.
The general response to these kinds of concerns, however, was not one 
of less private sector participation but rather one of better regulation.  As 
one senior manager noted: “The key issue is government ensuring that the 
service gets provided.  This doesn’t necessarily [mean that government] 
has to be the deliverer of services.  We need to hold the public authority 
accountable for this in terms of how the private sector engages poor people 
and builds on their skills”.
The ‘Bullish’ Respondents
In contrast to the ‘cautious’ approach to public-private partnerships, the 
‘bullish’ group of respondents held a one-dimensional view of privatization. 
This group clearly saw the private sector as being able to deliver services 
more effectively and less expensively than the public sector.  Effi ciency 
was the most frequently cited issue in deciding whether core or non-core 
services should be turned over to the private sector, regardless of equity 
concerns.  As one senior level manager noted:
Local government has increasingly outsourced engineering services 
and gotten more involved in the responsibility of community services.... 
The role of local government’s core function is to be the ensurer with 
services as stand-alone business units moving to public utilities then to 
the private sector.... Electricity and water are well suited for this line of 
thinking as they have a tariff base.
Other respondents were even fatalistic in their belief that the private sector 
was the only option for service delivery, with one manager stating that 
“there is no way to restructure the public sector without moving into the 
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private sector and the formation of utilities”.  Another manager suggested 
that the “public sector should only be considered once proven that it can 
beat the private sector with cost-effectiveness”.  
When asked what municipal services would be better provided by 
the private sector, one manager responded: “All of them.  Services like 
cleansing, water and electricity could be enhanced if there were greater 
competition”.  A senior councillor pushed this idea of competition further, 
stating that “everything within the public domain should be opened up 
for competition with the private sector”.  Another councillor confi rmed 
his preference for market-run services by adding: “The national framework 
agreement [signed between government and Cosatu which makes the 
public sector the ‘preferred service provider’] has to be discarded.  The 
private sector service delivery will be more effi cient than government when 
it can achieve the proper market situation”.  
This group of respondents were unanimous in their belief that the private 
sector could provide better services than the public sector, and there was 
widespread agreement amongst this group that privatization is an inevitable 
outcome of post-apartheid restructuring.  As one respondent articulated it: 
“The disparities in local government create a climate that makes it more 
diffi cult to save on costs.  This makes it diffi cult to compete with the private 
sector”.  In other words, privatization is seen by this group as a rational and 
unavoidable response to the ineffi ciencies of state-led planning and service 
delivery in the past.  There was little refl ection in this group as to how the 
move to a market-based approach to service delivery might consolidate the 
structural inequalities left by decades of apartheid planning.
It should also be noted that many of the managers and councillors 
interviewed made reference to “labour problems” as one of the key 
reasons for privatization.  There was a widespread perception amongst 
these interviewees that workers are “lazy and paid too much” and that job 
security for municipal workers is responsible for low labour productivity.   
As one manager argued: “Municipal workers are so secure in their jobs that 
those who want to work hard don’t have the opportunity”.  According to 
another, “the biggest barrier to equity [in service delivery] is the infl exibility 
of labour relations”.  
Signifi cantly, the strongest voices within this ‘bullish’ group were 
managers with an engineering background who were responsible for day-
to-day decisions regarding service delivery.  That these managers are, by 
and large, also products of the statist apartheid system, underscores the 
dramatic changes that have taken place in terms of policy orientation.  
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Corporatization:  Internalizing the Ideology of 
Privatization
Differences of opinion on the extent and scale of privatization aside, the 
local government decision makers interviewed for this research are more or 
less united in the acceptance of corporatization as a method of institutional 
change.  Chapter Two takes this theme up in detail but it is worth 
noting here that corporatization involves many of the same operating 
principles as privatization, such as performance-based management and 
full-cost recovery, without the political debates that accompany outright 
privatization (Moran 2000, 57).  
Corporatization also has the teleological effect of reforming services 
with the intent of outsourcing them; or as one manager confi rmed: “Once 
a service is benchmarked or quantifi able it is ready to be privatized”.  If 
the problem is that the “public sector isn’t geared to compete with the 
private sector” (as one manager stated), then local government in Cape 
Town has embarked on an intensive process of corporatization in order to 
ensure that it can compete with the private sector, and perhaps eventually 
be sold to the private sector.
Writing Privatization: The Evolution of 
Policy
Further evidence of the shift to private sector principles in the area of service delivery in Cape Town comes from policy documents and discussion papers – the most important of which have been put forward by the Unicity Commission (or “Unicom”)2 as part of 
its role in the reorganization of Cape Town municipalities in 2000.  The 
Unicom was composed of an equal number of ANC and NNP councillors 
(fi ve from each party) and one DP councillor, as per party political 
representation in the municipal structures at the time.  This group reviewed 
and voted on recommendations made by a team of technical advisors 
composed of senior bureaucrats from municipalities in the CMA and 
private sector consultants, such as PricewaterhouseCoopers which did 
much of the consulting work for the Unicom, and which continue to be 
active in developing policy papers in the new unicity.  
The Unicom policy recommendations are critical for at least two reasons.  
First, they represent the fi rst-ever policy recommendations to deal with 
the Cape Metropolitan Area in its entirety.  During the fi rst phase of post-
apartheid local government in Cape Town from 1996-2000 there were 
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seven municipal bodies, none of which had the political legitimacy or the 
constitutional authority to implement urban policies on a metropolitan scale. 
As a result, none of these bodies dealt with the range of governance issues 
with which the Unicom was mandated.  Moreover, none of the interim 
local government bodies had the requisite metropolitan-wide information 
needed for metropolitan decision making, due to the fragmentation of data 
and a lack of cooperation in sharing information between the different 
local agencies.  It was only with the power vested in the Unicom by the 
Municipal Structures Act (RSA 1998) that this information could be obtained, 
collated and acted upon in a centralized manner.
Second, the two major sets of policy recommendations put forward 
by the Unicom – the August 2000 “Discussion Document” and the 
November 2000 “Strategic Recommendations” – were unanimously 
(and uncontroversially) approved by the political representatives on the 
Commission.  The multi-party nature of the Commission, in turn, meant 
that these recommendations were broadly supported across political lines 
and went forward to the new unicity councillors with a stamp of approval 
from the major political parties.  
Two Unicom documents are examined here in some detail to reveal 
their explicit and implicit privatization objectives, starting with the 
Discussion Document. 
Discussion Document
Although the term “privatization” is not used in the Discussion Document, 
the report makes repeated references to private sector participation in a 
future unicity, and the Unicom clearly sees private sector involvement as 
the path to a “successful” and “competitive” Cape Town.  This avoidance 
of the term privatization, and the concomitant use of ‘soft’ language to 
refer to private sector involvement, is highly problematic because it tends 
to conceal, rather than reveal, the real policy thrusts in the document and 
makes it diffi cult for a lay person (or councillor for that matter) unfamiliar 
with the privatization terrain to know what the implications of ringfencing, 
partnerships and other service delivery initiatives might be.
The most explicit reference to increased private sector involvement in 
service delivery is the call to “move boldly beyond the current emphasis 
on service provision issues” to a position where the new unicity Council 
“understands its role as a service ensurer and as a guarantor of municipal 
services rather than as a primary service provider” (section 3.1).3  In other 
words, local government should act primarily as a regulator of services 
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while the private sector or some sort of public-private entity actually 
provides the services.  Although subtle, the shift in emphasis from “service 
provider” to “service ensurer” is a critical one, and adopts the language 
used by the World Bank (1994) in its policy positions on the matter.
Other euphemistic references to increased private sector participation 
and corporatization include: the need to “modernize” the way local 
government operates (section 3.3); the call for “greater competition” 
in service delivery (section 6.1); the call for a “strong emphasis” 
on a “partnership approach” in service delivery (section 6.2); the 
suggested “dismantling of current local government administrations and 
the establishment of a range of highly focused business units” (section 
8.1); the recommended creation of a “small and focused corporate center” 
to manage the activities of service delivery (section 8.2); and the call 
for “ringfenced business units” (section 8.3).  Terms such as “performance 
management” and “fl exibility” also pepper the Discussion Document.
Most importantly, there is a marked shortage of references in 
the Discussion Document to building public sector capacity and/or 
redistributing existing municipal resources in a more equitable manner.  
There is fl eeting reference to the need to improve the “skills base” of city 
employees (section 9.1) but there are no details as to what this “large 
investment” might entail fi nancially or how these skills development funds 
would be broken down between managers, politicians and labourers.  Nor 
is there any reference to the issue of resource distribution in the Cape 
Metropolitan Area (CMA)  – despite the fact that comprehensive audits of 
existing municipal resources have never been conducted and municipal 
resources remain highly skewed on a racial and geographical basis (on 
which more will be said later in the paper).  In short, the unicity’s 
Discussion Document fails to explore the public sector option in any 
meaningful way and places the private sector in the driver’s seat of service 
transformation in Cape Town.  
It is also worth noting that there was very little input from the public in the 
development of this Discussion Document.  There were a handful of public 
hearings with various ‘stakeholders’, but the inputs were largely post facto 
with virtually no opportunity for the public to participate during the course of 
developing the Document.  The process was effectively a closed shop for a 
small group of bureaucrats, politicians, and private sector consultants.  
This extremely limited participatory model brings into question the use 
of the term “consensus” in section 4.1 of the Discussion Document and 
highlights a profound tension between the stated aims of developing 
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a broadly participatory and democratic decision making model for the 
new unicity, and the thrust towards creating a “small and focused 
corporate center” (section 8.2).  While the need for some centralized 
bureaucratic decision-making by a relatively small group of people to run 
the daily operations of services is acknowledged, it is important to fl ag the 
democratic tensions inherent in this commercialized model of reform.  
Strategic Recommendations
The Discussion Document was eventually re-released in November of 
2000 as the Unicom’s “Strategic Recommendations” to the new unicity 
Council, but these recommendations did not fundamentally alter the pro-
privatization approach outlined above.  The term “privatization” is still not 
used, but the document is more explicit about its pro-privatization agenda, 
as demonstrated in the following “recommendation”: 
That all stakeholders acknowledge the reality that a signifi cant 
proportion of local government service delivery responsibilities are 
already outsourced, and that this proportion is likely to increase in 
future, particularly in the case of new services.4
The document goes on to make the following recommendations about 
the ringfencing of tradeable services like water, electricity, sanitation and 
sewerage: 
 • That service ringfencing initiatives should seek to foster 
  competitive incentives in service delivery where these are sensible 
  and appropriate.
 • That service ringfencing should always assist in revealing true 
  service delivery costs, and that all services should therefore be 
  ringfenced from a fi nancial accounting point of view.
 • That the service ringfencing should [be] undertaken on an 
  incremental basis, with increasing levels of decentralisation being 
  balanced by increasing levels of corporate capacity to manage 
  ringfenced services. Lessons from the experiences of Johannesburg 
  and other local governments should be gathered and applied.
 • That particular attention be given to addressing those aspects 
  of industrial relations which inhibit ringfencing initiatives and lead 
  to infl exible and ineffi cient human resource utilisation.
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This last recommendation is noteworthy in that it is the only reference 
to labour relations in the entire Strategic Recommendations document 
(despite the fact that there are over 20,000 labourers in the metropolitan 
area, and relations between the Unicom and the union which represents 
the overwhelming majority of labourers – the South African Municipal 
Workers Union  (Samwu) – were extremely tense at the time that the 
recommendations were written.5  The reference to labour is also a negative 
one, suggesting that labour will only “inhibit ringfencing initiatives” due to 
their “ineffi ciency” and “infl exibility”.
Although this quote in and of itself does not ‘prove’ an anti-labour 
bias in the Strategic Recommendations document, or within the unicity for 
that matter, it is nevertheless indicative of a prevailingly negative attitude 
towards organized labour amongst senior civil servants and councillors in 
the CMA (for a more detailed discussion see MSP 2000).  At the very least, 
the Unicity Commission’s documentation illustrates a marginalization of 
labour, with only one reference in the entire Strategic Recommendations 
document to the single most important resource in the CMA: workers (as 
compared to 23 references to “business”).
Moreover, there is no reference to the training or upgrading of skills 
of workers in the unicity, despite the fact that research conducted in 
early 2000 revealed a widespread lack of training for workers and 
poor health and safety records (MSP 2000).  By contrast, the Strategic 
Recommendations report singles out councillors for “strong training 
programmes... to facilitate [their] effectiveness”, and highlights the need 
for extensive IT training in order to create a new “smart city”.  The fact 
that thousands of municipal workers are still conducting dangerous and 
unhealthy tasks without proper health and safety training and equipment 
receives no mention in the Unicom’s recommendations. 
Most surprising of all, perhaps, is the lack of detail in both the 
Discussion Document and the Strategic Recommendations document – 
with the latter being no more than a table of point form notes with columns 
representing issues/options/recommendations.  This lack of detail is all the 
more surprising given that the Strategic Recommendations paper represents 
the fi nal recommendations of the Unicity Commission to the new unicity 
council, and was the culmination of twelve months of research and several 
million rands of public funds.   
There is additional detail contained in technical memoranda and 
confi dential annexures but no references are made to this additional 
technical data in the report and no efforts were made to distribute this 
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information to the general public.  Even the 27-page summary of the 
Strategic Recommendations document proved diffi cult to obtain, raising 
further questions about the process of reforms in the city.6
Campaigning for Privatization: The 2000 
Local Government Elections
The local government elections held in Cape Town on December 6, 2000 also provide interesting insights into the shift towards neoliberalism in the decision-making halls of Cape Town.  The election was won by the Democratic Alliance (DA) – a 
coalition of the New National Party (NNP) and the Democratic Party 
(DP) – who won 108 of the 200 seats available.  The ANC won 76 
seats (and 42% of the popular vote) with the remainder going to various 
smaller parties and independents.  Signifi cantly, the ANC refused to take 
up the four seats it was entitled to on the new ten-seat mayoral “executive 
committee”, arguing that it would compromise their ability to act as 
an effective opposition to the DA, stating that  “the ANC’s policies 
and approach to address poverty are fundamentally different than the 
DA’s”.7  Election posters and speeches also suggested signifi cant differences 
between the two main parties, and much was made of the different styles 
and approaches of the two opposing mayoral candidates.  
But just how different were the election platforms of the two main 
parties and what do they reveal about their ideological orientation, 
particularly on issues of privatization and corporatization?  We start with 
the Democratic Alliance’s election positions and then compare these to 
the ANC’s.  The sources for these comparisons are political speeches made 
during the election campaign, press coverage, and, most importantly, the 
“election manifestos” issued by the national offi ces of the two parties.  The 
rupture of the DA alliance in late 2001 and its implications for privatization 
policy in Cape Town are also addressed.     
The Democratic Alliance
On the issue of privatizing municipal services (as well as corporatizing and 
outsourcing), the DA takes an explicit and very ‘bullish’ neoliberal position 
(DA 2000, section 6):
In DA-controlled municipalities, cost savings through competitive out-
sourcing and privatisation will be instituted in an ongoing drive to 
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provide better value for money.  Local and international experience has 
shown that the introduction of a businesslike approach, competition, 
and private sector involvement in the delivery of municipal services, 
in other words commercialisation leading to appropriate out-sourcing 
and privatisation, leads to signifi cant savings and improvement in the 
quality of services delivered.  Privatisation and outsourcing also creates 
new opportunities for employment in the private sector and increases 
job creation in new projects fi nanced with the resultant cost savings.  
The eventual effect is more overall employment in the city or town, and 
more wealth for all the people.
In terms of which services “lend themselves to variants of commercial-
isation, competitive outsourcing and privatisation”, the DA argues for 
virtually every service that municipalities have responsibility for: “garbage 
and solid waste disposal, fi re protection, emergency ambulance services, 
maintenance of parks and recreational amenities, public transport systems, 
certain social services and primary health care, certain planning and 
zoning functions, water and sanitation, and certain municipal management 
functions” (DA 2000, section 6).  The manifesto goes on to say that “savings 
of between 20% and 60% for particular outsourced or privatised services 
are generally possible” and cites “successful” examples of such savings 
from around the country and around the world.  
This is a clear and strong endorsement for a signifi cantly increased role 
for private sector service delivery at the level of local government on the 
part of the DA.  Democratic Alliance councillor Ian Neilson articulated this 
position succinctly during the Cape Town election campaign, arguing that 
“only competitive service delivery, through outsourcing and privatisation, 
will achieve [cost savings in municipal services]” (Cape Argus, August 19, 
2000).  The fact that there is no mention in the DA’s manifesto about 
building public sector capacity or looking for public sector effi ciency gains 
through a more equitable distribution of municipal resources (the term 
“public sector” is not even used in the manifesto), also speaks to the DA’s 
pro-privatization position on service delivery.
Other DA policy positions that underscore their neoliberal focus are:  
 • Competitive cities: “Local government must create enabling 
  environments to develop world-class cities and towns and locally 
  competitive and viable municipalities”.  To do so, the DA proposes 
  “local enterprise zones offering rates holidays and subsidised 
  infrastructure development aimed at targeted investment” (DA 
  2000, 11).
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 • Cost recovery: the DA promises to “create a culture of payment 
  for all services consumed above the lifeline level, inter alia by 
  strictly collecting all arrears and debt.  DA municipalities will 
  also clamp down on people stealing municipal services like water 
  and electricity.  Towards this aim we will institute improved 
  controls and monitoring, including more effective metering 
  systems” (DA 2000, 25).
 • City improvement districts (CIDs): the DA promotes geographical 
  segregation of service delivery and promise that “levies raised 
  from property owners will be spent only in the CID and only 
  on the priorities identifi ed by the local residents and businesses”.  
  The CID’s will furthermore be “developed, managed and promoted 
  by [private] Regeneration Companies” (DA 2000, 27-8). 
 • Municipal workers and organized labour: the DA promises to 
  “continue to drive the process of amending rigid labour laws in 
  order to make it easier for business to create jobs.... DA controlled 
  local governments will work towards increased labour fl exibility 
  and a new co-operative relationship with organised labour” (DA 
  2000, 33). 
 • Property rates: the DA promises to “levy the minimum necessary, 
  rather than the maximum possible, levels of rates”, arguing that “any 
  form of taxation on wealth, such as property rates... is ultimately a 
  tax on initiative, savings and investment (DA 2000, 34).
Some observers have argued that the Democratic Party was behind the 
“ideological content of the DA election manifesto”.  Members of the NNP, 
by contrast, “favour policies that are more obviously social in nature, 
aimed at reducing relative disadvantage... [due to] its racist past and 
signifi cant constituency among the coloured population of the Western 
Cape” (Idasa 2001, 5).  To some extent this may be true, with anti-
privatization comments having been made by senior NNP politicians in the 
past.8   For the most part, however, NNP councilors have expressed strong 
support for service privatization, both in their interviews for this research 
as well as their public statements on the matter.  And with the ascendancy 
of DP-affi liated councilors and bureaucrats since the break-up of the DA it 
is all the more likely that the strident neoliberal views of the Democratic 
Party will dominate the transformation agenda of the city should the DA 
manage to retain control of the council.  
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The African National Congress
The ANC’s offi cial position on the privatization of municipal services is 
more ambiguous than that of the DP and the NNP.  At times the party 
suggests that the public sector should be the “preferred” service provider 
while at other times (often in the same document) it opens the door to 
increased private sector participation.
One illustration of this ambiguity is found in the party’s local 
government election manifesto from 2000.  The manifesto initially makes 
a commitment to the public sector as the “preferred option to provide 
services”, but then goes on to say that “where a local government lacks the 
necessary capacity, it may engage in partnerships with other government 
institutions, such as state-owned enterprise or other local governments, as 
well as community organisations and/or the private sector” (ANC 2000, 4).
The ANC mayoral candidate for Cape Town, Lynn Brown, was equally 
ambiguous on the matter, stating at a community forum on privatization 
held in November of 2000 that she is “opposed to privatization without 
proper evaluation and public consultation”, but then held out public-
private partnerships and other forms of commercialization as “possible 
alternatives” for service delivery in the new unicity.9
This is not the fi rst time that the ANC has promised to make 
the public sector the “preferred service provider”.  Having made a 
commitment in 1998 in a “National Framework Agreement”, signed 
with the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu), that the 
public sector would be the “preferred service provider” for municipal 
services, the ANC-run national government then went on to write the 
Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000a) which abandoned the language of 
“preferred provider” altogether and promoted other commercialization 
criteria such as “public-private partnerships”. 
On issues of cost recovery, competitive cities, CIDs, municipal workers 
and property rates (issues on which the DA had much to say in their 
election manifesto), the ANC was remarkably silent during the election 
campaign.  Nor was anything said on these critical and controversial issues 
in the ANC’s offi cial election material.  
One is left wondering, therefore, what makes the ANC’s policies in 
Cape Town so “fundamentally different” from those of the DA, at least 
when it comes to policy choices on privatization, corporatization and cost 
recovery of services.  To better answer this question it is necessary to look 
at the ANC in practice – i.e., its policy actions while it was in power in 
two municipal authorities in Cape Town during the interim governments 
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of 1996-2000.  ‘The proof of the pudding’, as the saying goes, ‘is in the 
eating’, and in this case the record of the ANC in Cape Town is one of 
increasing privatization and outsourcing, aggressive cost recovery, and the 
introduction and promotion of CIDs.  
Doing Privatization: The Track Record of 
Local Government in Cape Town from 
1996-2000
At the local government election forum on privatization referred to earlier, Peter Marais, the DA mayoral candidate (and subsequent mayor of the new unicity until the split in the DA), began his speech with a lengthy list of municipalities in South Africa where 
services had been privatized: Johannesburg, Stutterheim, Nelspruit, Cape 
Town, Tygerberg, Dophin Coast, and Durban (to name but a few on his 
list).  “All of these municipalities”, he went on to say, “are ANC controlled”. 
His point was that the ANC may talk about the public sector being the 
“preferred option” for service delivery, but when it comes to practice they 
are no different than the DA.  
His point seemed to be lost on the overwhelmingly partisan ANC crowd, 
which seemed more intent on provoking Marais’ famous temper (which 
they eventually managed to do), than on listening to what differences 
may exist between the two political parties when it comes to privatization 
policies.  Marais was right, however.  It is the ANC, not the DA, that has 
been behind the most ambitious municipal privatization programmes in 
the country – with Johannesburg’s iGoli 2002 being but the largest and 
most controversial example.  The DP and the NNP have been supportive 
of all of these initiatives (and have even rebuked the ANC for not 
going far enough or fast enough with its privatization agenda), but it is 
ANC-led councils which have been the primary driving force behind the 
commercialization of municipal services in the country.
The same is true in Cape Town.  In the two municipal substructures 
that were controlled by the ANC from 1996 to 2000 (Tygerberg and the 
City of Cape Town), the outsourcing of municipal services was widespread 
and included library services, industrial refuse collection, street cleaning, 
child care, parking, water reticulation services, and a myriad of other core 
and non-core services. 
The City of Cape Town also introduced the fi rst city improvement 
districts (CIDs) in the metropolitan area.  The fi rst of these came on stream 
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in November 2000 in the central business district of Cape Town with much 
fanfare from city council and local business associations.  The council 
released a multi-paged, colour broadsheet announcing the benefi ts of the 
CID with two of the ANC’s top councillors and a senior administrator 
pictured on the front page striding confi dently across an intersection in the 
centre of the city.  A second CID was operationalized in December 2000 
in Claremont (a secondary but growing business node in a predominantly 
white suburb), with promises of many more CIDs to come (up to 60 of 
them over the next few years according to the director of the private fi rm 
responsible for developing these initiatives).  
The two CIDs in operation include private sector policing, video 
monitoring, increased private sector cleansing (with disinfectants for the 
sidewalks and streets), and policies of removing vagrants and informal 
parking attendants from the CID areas.  Promotional material for the 
Claremont CID included a full front-page advertisement in a local 
community newspaper with the CID’s puppet mascot, Clarie, carrying a 
large police club in its hand.10
These two ANC-controlled councils were also responsible for massive 
cutoffs for non-payment of services.  In the former substructures of Cape 
Town and Tygerberg, for example, there were a total of 75,400 cutoffs in 
1999 and 2000 alone (see Table 2).11  Assuming an average household 
demographic in low-income areas of fi ve people, this represents a total of 
377,000 people in these two suburbs who experienced water cutoffs for at 
least some period of time (with some of these people/households no doubt 
representing repeat cutoffs).   
This history of ANC-sanctioned cutoffs in Cape Town contrasts starkly 
with the party’s call for free lifeline supplies of water and electricity as 
part of their election platform.12  Moreover, it brings into question the 
legitimacy of the ANC’s insistence at the fi rst unicity council meeting on 
December 15, 2000, that there be a moratorium on all future water and 
electricity cutoffs until a lifeline policy has been put in place (a proposal 
which was unanimously accepted by a DA-dominated council with its own 
track record of water cutoffs but which was subsequently ignored when 
water cutoffs continued in 2001). 
Both the ANC and the DA have therefore been ‘doing privatization’ in 
the Cape Metropolitan Area for many years now.  To the extent that the 
ANC is different from the DA in this regard, it would appear to be a matter 
of degrees, and the extent to which the DA is willing to be explicit and 
consistent in its policy choices.
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Table 2: Water Cutoffs in Cape Town and Tygerberg 
substructures: 1999-2000
The National and International Picture
No analysis of change in Cape Town would be complete without an evaluation of the larger national and international picture – politically, ideologically and economically.  Although increasingly autonomous from other tiers of 
government, Cape Town operates within fi scal and political constraints 
as a municipality and it is essential to understand the effect that these 
constraints have had on local policy choices, particularly with respect to 
the privatization of municipal services.  
We look here briefl y at three national initiatives that have encouraged 
the privatization of municipal services – the Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution (GEAR) framework, the Municipal Infrastructure Investment 
Unit (MIIU), and the Municipal Systems Act – as well as some international 
pressures.  These are not the only factors bearing on local government 
decision making but they do provide an indication of the pro-privatization 
climate within which local governments in South Africa are operating.
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) 
The Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) macro-economic 
framework was introduced by the ANC national government in 1996.  
Compiled and released to the public without consultation with labour, 
GEAR represents a signifi cant swing to the right for the ANC in fi scal and 
monetary policy terms and downplays much of the interventionist and 
redistributive Keynesianism that was to be found in GEAR’s predecessor, 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).  
GEAR’s effect on municipal infrastructure and service delivery has 
9991 0002 latoT
nwoTepaC 982,1 870,4 763,5
grebregyT 895,9 534,06 330,07
slatoT 788,01 315,46 004,57
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been profound.  First, it has resulted in signifi cant decreases in 
intergovernmental transfers from national to local governments in the name 
of fi scal restraint.  Although these cuts began as far back as the early 
1990s under the then-ruling National Party, transfer squeezes continued 
and escalated after the ANC came to power at the national level, resulting 
in an 85% decrease (in real terms) in intergovernmental transfers to local 
government between 1991 and 1997 according to the Finance and Fiscal 
Commission (1997) and a further 55% in Cape Town between 1997 and 
2000 (Unicity Commission 2000).
In fi scal 2000, intergovernmental transfers to local governments across 
South Africa were in the order of R3 billion per year, with a possible 
increase of only 15% over the next few years.  Projections of the capital 
costs of addressing service backlogs, meanwhile, are in the order of R45 to 
R89 billion (depending on the level of services provided) with government-
sponsored operating costs (e.g., free lifeline services) adding many billions 
more per year (RSA 1995, 2000d).  National government’s contribution to 
infrastructure development is therefore woefully inadequate.
National government has also put caps on rates increases that local 
governments are able to levy on (wealthy) property owners.  The Draft 
Local Government Property Rates Bill of 2000, for example, states that 
local governments cannot apply taxes at the local level which threaten 
its own tax-reducing, fi scally conservative strategy, as evidenced by the 
following quotations (RSA 2000b, Chapter 2, Sections 4-5):
A municipality may not...exercise its power to levy rates on property 
in a way that would materially and unreasonably prejudice national 
economic policies, economic activities across its boundaries, or the 
national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour.
The Minister, with the concurrence of the Minister of Finance, may 
by notice in the Gazette set a limit on the amount of the rate that 
municipalities may levy on property; or the percentage by which a rate 
on property may be increased annually.
With approximately 90% of all local government revenues being generated 
locally (of which approximately 25% come from property rates), these caps 
mean that local governments are unable to signifi cantly increase their own 
revenue pools through progressive taxation – and this at a time when 
municipalities have been asked to do more, not less, with the resources that 
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they have.  National government has, in effect, created ‘unfunded mandates’ 
which municipalities cannot possibly hope to fulfi ll within the current revenue 
structures.  It is little wonder, then, that local authorities have begun to look to 
the private sector as a way to fi nance and expand service delivery. 
Less concrete, but arguably just as signifi cant, is the ideological climate 
that GEAR has spawned in the country.  With the Finance Ministry enjoying 
unchallenged supremacy in Cabinet at a national level, and with fi scal 
conservancy being the order of the day in international bodies to which 
the country belongs (or would like to join), the Thatcherite adage of “There 
Is No Alternative” has never been stronger in South Africa.  To challenge 
the orthodoxy of fi scal restraint and cost recovery, even if you are an ANC 
local government councillor outside the purview of national government, 
can either mean political alienation or outright disbarment (as was the 
case with one Soweto-based ANC Councillor – Trevor Ngwane – who was 
forced out of the party due to his public criticisms of the Johannesburg city 
council’s privatisation plans called iGoli 2002).  
Even the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu) and the 
South African Communist Party have muted their criticisms of GEAR and 
national government’s own privatization initiatives of late.  One notable 
exception was a two-day Cosatu-led strike protesting privatization held in 
August of 2001 with some four million workers taking part, but Cosatu 
has since re-affi rmed its commitment to the ANC alliance and its broad 
development plans.
Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) 
The formation of the Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit (MIIU) in 
1997 is an important development here as well.  Established as a fi ve-year 
programme with funding from foreign donors, the MIIU’s stated Mission 
is “to encourage and optimise private sector investment in local authority 
services” (MIIU 2000).  Activities to be undertaken involve “assistance to 
local authorities in the process of hiring private sector consultants and the 
management of contracts with the private sector” and “developing project 
proposals involving private sector investment”. 
These investments can take a broad range of forms, including:
 • Private sector fi nancing of municipal debt;
 • Contracting out of the management of ongoing services;
 • Concessions to operate the local authority’s assets over a defi ned 
  period;
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 • Contracts requiring the private sector to Design, Build, Finance 
  and Operate assets to deliver services for the local authority;
 • Privatization of assets and services. 
The MIIU has been active in promoting and fi nancing the privatization and 
corporatization of municipal services and has provided advice and funding 
to dozens of municipalities in the country along these lines, including 
the controversial 30-year contracting of water in Nelspruit.  The fact that 
there is no parallel organization set up at a national level to promote and 
conduct research on how best to improve and extend public sector service 
delivery is perhaps the most telling indication of the ideological impulses 
driving urban policy in central government.  
Municipal Systems Act
The Municipal Systems Act (RSA 2000a) is also worth mentioning insofar 
as it provides the legislative framework for municipal service delivery 
and determines the scope for private sector involvement.  In contrast 
to the ANC’s local government election manifesto of 2000 which stated 
that “national and provincial governments will keep the public sector 
as the preferred provider of municipal services”, and contrary to the 
“preferred option” language of the National Framework Agreement 
signed with Cosatu in 1998,13 the Municipal Systems Act fails to use 
the word “preferred” altogether.  In fact, the most relevant section 
of the Act (Chapter 8, Part 2) places the public sector on equal 
footing with alternative service delivery options, including private-public 
partnerships and outright privatization: although a municipality must “fi rst 
assess...internal mechanisms” when evaluating service delivery options, it 
may, at the same time, “explore the possibility of providing the service 
through an external mechanism” (RSA 2000a, 72-74).  In other words, 
the promises made by the ANC in their election manifesto and National 
Framework Agreement are effectively nullifi ed by the binding legislation of 
the Municipal Systems Act.    
Further evidence of this erosion of the public sector as the “preferred 
option” is found in the Department of Local and Provincial Government’s 
White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships (the ANC’s euphemism for 
‘public-private partnerships’).  Released in early 2000, the paper attempts 
to clarify the government’s position on “preferred options” but succeeds 
merely in establishing the downgrading of the public option to one that is 
no more important than private sector initiatives:
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While the Government is committed to facilitating the use of MSP 
[municipal service partnerships] arrangements, this does not mean that 
MSPs are the preferred option for improving service delivery.  It is rather 
that MSPs should enjoy equal status among a range of possible service 
delivery options available to municipal councils (RSA 2000c, 14).
The Role of International Organizations
We look fi nally at the role of international organizations in the promotion 
of privatization in South Africa.  The fact that the MIIU is funded by an 
outside donor agency has already been alluded to, and there are many 
other instances of direct funding of privatization initiatives in South Africa 
by donor groups, but it is the role of multilateral organizations like the 
World Bank and the United Nations that are most critical.  
Bond (1999, 2000) has documented the role that the World Bank 
in particular has played in shaping local government policy in South 
Africa and argues that their ideological infl uence in terms of promoting 
privatization, cost recovery and other forms of commercialization has been 
profound.  The same applies to Cape Town where several large World Bank 
missions were sent in the early 1990s and where there remains ongoing 
collaboration and contact with senior city offi cials (the Bank’s annual 
“Competitive Cities” conference being one example).  
The World Bank has also teamed up with the United National 
Development Programme (UNDP) in the form of the Urban Management 
Programme which promotes private sector involvement in services in the 
region.  The UNDP has also recently helped to establish the “Public-Private 
Partnerships for the Urban Environment” initiative based in Pretoria.  There is 
pressure from the World Trade Organization as well in terms of having South 
Africa ratify the General Agreement on Trades and Services (GATS) framework 
which, critics have argued, paves the way for multinational corporations to 
take over public services (Pollock and Price, 2000; Sexton 2001). 
And fi nally, there are the large multinational corporations 
themselves, eager to win service contracts in South Africa.  The French 
water company, Suez Lyonnaise Des Eaux, for example, which won the 
contract to manage Johannesburg’s water for fi ve years, is the second 
largest water company in the world with a corporate group turnover of 
approximately US$30 billion a year (as compared to Anglo American 
Corporation at US$21 billion per year) and is ranked 69th on Fortune’s 
1999 Global 500 List.  With enormous resources at hand, and with a 
track record of bribery and corruption in an attempt to win contracts 
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in other parts of the world (Hawley 2000; Loftus and McDonald 2001), 
large private service providers like Suez have altered the terrain of 
political decision making in national and local government.  Witness 
the following quote from an interview with a senior water manager in 
Cape Town: “Lyonnais des Eaux has come knocking on my door on two 
occasions.  These French water companies have become too powerful 
to resist.  The takeover is inevitable.”
These international pressures are perhaps no different or intense 
in South Africa than they are in other cities in the South.  My 
point here is simply to illustrate that municipalities in South Africa 
– and municipal decision makers – operate in both a national and 
international environment which makes it easy to promote privatization 
and corporatization and diffi cult to explore public sector reform options.  
Room for Manoeuvre 
Does this mean that local government decision makers in Cape Town are impotent in the face of a pro-privatization climate at the national and international level?  Far from it.  In this fi nal section of the chapter it is argued that there 
is considerable room for policy manoeuvre at the local level and that 
decision makers in Cape Town have the political and economic space to 
retain and improve public services.  
A few examples of the options available to council are offered here – 
not as a blueprint for reform, but rather as an indication of the possibilities 
that exist to improve public sector service delivery and which have been 
under-explored. 
Increased Intergovernmental Transfers 
One way in which the city of Cape Town could pursue alternatives 
to privatization and full-cost recovery is to challenge the national 
government’s miserly intergovernmental transfers.  With a 55% decrease 
in intergovernmental transfers from the national level between 1997 
and 2000 the city of Cape Town has a right to be pushing national 
government in this regard.  
Ironically, it may be the pro-privatization Democratic Alliance in Cape 
Town that will make this fi scal push in an effort to win favour amongst 
Cape Town’s urban poor while at the same time trying to embarrass the 
ANC at a national level.  Indeed, the DA suggested as much during the 
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2000 election campaign in Cape Town and it was fl agged as an issue in 
the party’s election manifesto – something that the ANC election manifesto 
failed to mention.  The party has yet to follow through with this threat, but 
the political option remains.
A Fairer Distribution of Public Resources
Another area where local councillors and bureaucrats could improve 
public sector service delivery without resorting to the private sector 
is with a better distribution of public resources.  It was, in fact, this 
kind of redistribution of human, fi nancial and capital resources that 
was behind the push to reorganize municipalities in the early 1990s.  
White municipalities have long had signifi cantly higher levels of resources 
on a per capita basis and it was hoped that there would be a major 
redistribution of these resources after 1994 (Swilling, Humphries and 
Shubane 1991, Smith 1992, Ahmad 1995). 
Unfortunately, the distribution of municipal resources in the 
metropolitan area appears to have remained fairly static.  Research 
conducted by the Municipal Services Project in mid-2000, for example, 
found that per capita distribution of public resources for water delivery and 
waste management are highly skewed along race and class lines – with 
as many as 100 times the resources being available in historically white 
suburbs as are available in black townships on a per capita basis.14 
To illustrate, Table 3 provides a breakdown of the personnel and 
equipment available for residential waste management in the CMA.15  
The fi gures refer to the number of people per piece of equipment and 
per municipal employee, with lower numbers indicating higher levels 
of resources per person.  The 33 waste depots have been divided into 
those that predominantly service suburban areas (e.g., the Claremont 
depot) and those that service predominantly African and coloured 
township areas (e.g., the Langa and Bontheheuwel depots) and been 
have aggregated for the metropolitan area as a whole.  The former 
represent approximately 800,000 residents and the latter some 1.7 
million residents.  It should be noted, however, that there is overlap 
in some of the areas serviced by the depots.  As a result, the 
fi gures provided here should be seen only as general indicators of 
resource distribution.  Nevertheless, they do illustrate dramatic resource 
differentials along race/class lines.
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Table 3: Distribution of Waste Management Resources in the 
CMA by Depot
Even more dramatic are the direct comparisons of particular depots.  Table 
4 provides a comparison of the waste depot in Durbanville (an upper-
income and predominantly white suburb) with that of Khayelitsha (an 
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have been chosen for comparison in part because of their race/class 
divide but also because they were part of the same municipal substructure 
(Tygerberg) from 1996-2000 and demonstrate the lack of transformation 
that took place during that period.  
In every category the Khayelitsha depot has signifi cantly lower levels of 
resources than that of Durbanville.  Even in the area of capital expenditures 
– public funds used to upgrade and or expand service facilities – the 
Durbanville depot received 10 times as much money in the last fi scal year 
(1999-2000).
Table 4: A Comparison of Resources in Waste Depots in 
Khayalitsha and Durbanville
The same is true of water services. Table 5 provides a comparison of the 
human, capital and fi nancial resources available to the Durbanville and 
Khayelitsha water depots.  In this case, data on cumulative operating and 
capital expenditures from 1996-2000 were also available and illustrate a 
strong bias in favour of Durbanville during that four-year period, with more 
than fi ve times more being spent in Durbanville than Khayelitsha on capital 
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Table 5: A Comparison of Resources in Water Depots in 
Khayalitsha and Durbanville
It is worth noting here that these data represent the fi rst attempt to collect 
metropolitan-wide statistics on municipal resources in the CMA, despite 
legislation requiring that such audits be done and despite repeated requests 
from organized labour for information on resource distribution.  That 
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apartheid transition raises, yet again, questions about the commitment of 
city politicians and bureaucrats to the transformation of public resources in 
the city.  Most importantly, the fi gures highlight the potential for creating a 
more equitable and effi cient public sector with existing public resources. 
Exploring Public Sector Options
Additional room for manoeuvre could also be found in the running 
of ‘pilot tests’ to examine public sector alternatives more concretely.  
Unfortunately, this potential has been largely ignored and even actively 
resisted by municipal managers in Cape Town.  One case that has been 
documented is the privatization of waste removal in Khayelitsha (Qotloe 
and Xali 2001).  In the late 1990s, managers from the (then) Tygerberg 
municipality rejected offers from the local branch of the South African 
Municipal Workers Union to pilot test public sector solutions to waste 
management in the township.  According to shop stewards in Samwu 
at the time, there were enormous potentials for redistributing vehicles 
and personnel from the formerly whites-only part of the municipality 
to Khayelitsha for a large once-off clean-up, followed by a longer-term 
waste management strategy that would utilize existing public resources 
more equitably and effi ciently.  Their requests for a pilot test were 
rejected out-of-hand by Tygerberg managers, and waste collection in 
Khayelitsha was outsourced to a private, micro-enterprise consortium.  
Given the fi gures provided above on waste management resource 
disparities in Tygerberg this is one example of a service that could 
possible have been signifi cantly improved using public resources rather 
than the private sector.  
A Moratorium on Privatization
Given the potential scope for public sector reform it is also arguable that 
there should be a moratorium on the privatization of municipal services 
– at least until the most diffi cult stages of amalgamating the various 
municipalities in the Cape Metropolitan Area have been completed and 
better information on public resources has been gathered.  A moratorium 
would prevent the premature sale or ringfencing of services that have the 
potential to become more effi cient and equitable public sector entities.  In 
other words, it would be wise to hold off on what could be irreversable 
decisions about privatization and corporatization until such time as there 
is a better understanding of the service potentials and resources in the 
metropolitan area as a whole.  
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Interestingly, the ANC called for exactly this kind of a moratorium on 
privatization in the fi rst meeting of the new unicity on December 15, 2000, 
a proposal that the ruling Democratic Alliance voted down.  Why the 
ANC did not impose such a moratorium while they themselves were in 
offi ce, and why they introduced some of the farthest reaching privatization 
initiatives yet undertaken in Cape Town in the form of city improvement 
districts just weeks before making this demand in city council, is diffi cult 
to say.  What it does illustrate is that the potential for stopping the 
privatization/corporatization of municipal services in Cape Town does exist 
and that it is largely a matter of political will.  
Conclusions
The irony of this shift to neoliberalism in Cape Town is that during the 1970s and 1980s white Capetonians received heavily subsidized municipal services.  Per capita municipal expenditures in white suburbs in that period were on par with, and in many cases 
higher than, municipal expenditures and subsidies in European and North 
American cities (Ahmad 1995) – partly at the expense of black South 
Africans whose rates and taxes went largely to white municipal councils 
(Swilling, Cobbett and Hunter 1991).  After years of subsidizing municipal 
service delivery in white areas under apartheid, poor (black) Capetonians 
now fi nd themselves largely denied the same cross-subsidizing benefi ts as 
their fellow white residents in the name of effi ciency and transparency. 
This is not to suggest that the state should always, and uncritically, 
subsidize service delivery.  There are very good reasons to introduce more 
accountable and transparent systems of fi nance and local governance in 
Cape Town (and South Africa in general).  
The point being made here is that privatization is taking place in the 
city in an unplanned and ad hoc fashion without any real public debate 
or intensive research into alternatives.  The room for manoeuvre on service 
delivery policy, as has been noted, is considerable, and the potential for 
improved public sector service provision largely unexplored. 
In the end it may be poor communities themselves who will force 
a rethinking of cost recovery and privatization policies.  The aggressive 
forced removals and cutting off of water supplies to poor families in areas 
like Tafelsig in Mitchell’s Plain have created a considerable groundswell 
of support for oppositional politics.  Rumblings of resistance to the 
neoliberal transformation can be found in organizations such as the Local 
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Government Transformation Forum and in various affected communities.  
How these dissatisfactions play themselves out and whether there will be 
an opportunity to engage local government decision makers in a process 




The Corporatization of Water
By Laïla Smith
Lyonnais des Eaux has come knocking on my door on two occasions.  
These French water companies have become too powerful to resist.  
The takeover is inevitable.  I want to run our services like solid business 
units to make sure that we negotiate from a position of strength when 
it does happen.  
Senior Water Manager, City of Cape Town, July 200016
As part of its broader shift towards the commercialization of municipal services the city of Cape Town is proposing to corporatize its water and sanitation services (along with those of solid waste and electricity).  Although different in some respects 
from privatization and outsourcing, corporatization shares many of the 
same operating principles and is often the fi rst step towards the outright 
privatization of a service, as the above quote attests to.
But what is corporatization exactly and what are its implications 
for service delivery in Cape Town?  This chapter looks specifi cally at 
the corporatization of water.  The fi rst part of the chapter traces the 
commercialization of water in Cape Town since 1996 and sets the stage for 
an understanding of why corporatization is being proposed as a model for 
institutional change.  The fi nancial situation in the water sector is reviewed, 
as well as water demand management approaches, billing practices, debt 
management policies and the growing trend of outsourcing.   The second 
part of the chapter outlines the concept of corporatization and how it is 
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being implemented with respect to water and sanitation in Cape Town.   
The fi nal section of the chapter discusses some of the potential 
problems associated with the corporatization of water in Cape Town, 
specifi cally as they relate to question of accountability, integrated decision 
making, cost recovery, and the impact of making the fi nancial bottom line 
the most important single decision-making factor.  There are also concerns 
with the process by which these corporatization plans have unfolded 
in Cape Town.  Having been postponed in early 2001 for violating the 
Municipal Systems Act procedurally, the planning and negotiating of water 
corporatization has resumed but remains largely behind closed doors 
with private sector consultants and no effective labour or community 
participation or consultation.  As a case in point, when the South African 
Municipal Workers Union (Samwu) was notifi ed about the plans to 
corporatize services in Cape Town in early 2001 they were informed in 
writing that “This is a lawful decision of Council and we do not have to 
justify the decisions to the unions....  There is no need to respond to every 
question in detail”.17  The chapter then concludes with a brief discussion of 
the possible alternatives to corporatization.   
Data for the chapter derives from archival material, key-informant 
interviews with local government offi cials and consultants,18 and random 
and representative interviews with household decision makers in low-
income townships.19  Data was drawn largely from the former municipal 
substructures of Cape Town and Tygerberg, the two most densely populated 
municipalities in what is now the Cape Town unicity, constituting 66% of 
the total population of the metropolitan area. 
The Commercialization of Water in Cape 
Town Since 1996
One of the key motives for commercializing water services in Cape Town (i.e. running the service more like a business than a government department) has been to improve cost recovery.  The water sector has been unable to recover 
its costs for several years.  Unaccounted For Water (UAFW), poor 
billing practices in low-income areas, and non-payment for services 
rendered have contributed to the progressive operational under-recovery 
of R100 million per annum in the water sector alone, with accumulated 
outstanding debts in the water and sewerage sector as a whole standing at 
R516.7 million in late 2001 – constituting close to one quarter (23.5%) of 
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the city’s total outstanding service debts (PWC 2001, 14).  
In response to this growing debt local authorities in the Cape 
Metropolitan Area (CMA) have instituted a series of policies since 1996 
to try and improve the fi nancial situation of the water sector.  These 
policies are: water demand management; streamlining billing practices; 
developing more rigid debt management strategies; and outsourcing.  Each 
of these policies is reviewed below, with specifi c reference to the former 
substructures of Cape Town and Tygerberg, with the latter two illustrating the 
growing trend towards the commercialization of water services in the city.   
Water Demand Management
While local authorities in Cape Town have been conscious of the need 
for water conservation strategies for decades, water demand management 
was only developed as a coherent policy by the mid-1990s.  The 
development of a National Water Act in 1995 provided some impetus 
in this regard but it was the rejection of an application by the Cape 
Metropolitan Council (CMC) to build a new dam (Skiifraam) that pushed 
municipal authorities to take water demand management seriously.  In 
rejecting the CMC application the Department of Water Affairs and 
Forestry argued that no new dams could be built without an effective 
water demand strategy in place.  
In response, Cape Town introduced a three-pronged water demand 
management programme.  The fi rst aspect of the programme is the 
reduction of unaccounted for water, which generally involves the repairing/
replacing of leaky pipes as well as the extension of metered services.  For 
instance, in the municipality of Cape Town, approximately 43,000 new 
water connections were put into the former Black Local Authority areas 
through the three-year Ikapa Water Leaks Project.  This initiative restored 
degraded infrastructure, repaired burst mains, installed meters in unbilled 
areas and trained local plumbers on how to repair household water leaks.   
The project saved the water department R10 million per annum by virtue 
of reducing water leakages.  Nevertheless, water losses remain high due 
to leakages of aging pipes and it is estimated that it will take 300 years 
to replace all the water mains in the city at the current rate of capital 
expenditures (CMC 2001, 15). 
A second aspect of the programme is public education, which involves 
billboard and media advertising to try and reduce household water 
consumption through water reduction technology (e.g., low-fl ow shower 
heads) and changed consumption patterns.  The introduction of water 
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restrictions (e.g., watering of gardens banned from 10 am to 4 pm during 
the summer) and the promotion of the use of indigenous plants are 
examples of the latter.  
Finally, increased prices for water at higher levels of consumption have 
been used to try and reduce the overuse of water (i.e., block tariffs – 
the principle of ‘the more you use the more you pay’).  A decades-old 
three-step block tariff was replaced by a fi ve-step block tariff in 1998 and 
implemented across the six local authorities, albeit with differential rates 
for each block, and fi nally rationalized across the metropolitan area in 
2001 (see Table 6).  The top domestic tariff is based at the marginal cost 
of future infrastructure, such as the building of the Skiifraam dam, and is 
currently set at R7.00 per kilolitre (kl).
Table 6: Water Tariff Schedule for Cape Town Unicity as at 
July 1, 2001
Source: Proposed Tariff Reports for the 2001/02 Financial Year: City of Cape 
Town, May 2001:  Addendum W-D.



















The Corporatization of Water in Cape Town
Figure 1 illustrates price increases in the former substructures of Cape Town 
and Tygerberg from 1997 to 2000, for households consuming 60 kl of 
water per month (i.e., high consumption).  The price drop in Cape Town 
in 2001 is a result of the tariff convergence with the unicity in July of 
that year.  
Figure 1
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For households consuming less water (e.g., 10 kl per household per month) 
there were also price increases from 1997-2000 but the tariff convergence 
and the implementation of the ‘free water’ policy for the fi rst six kilolitres 
as of July 1, 2001, has resulted in a slight decrease in costs for these 
households (see Figure 2).  The effectiveness of the free water policy in 
actually targeting the poor is still in question, however, as it assumes that 
low-income households consume little.  The reality in low-income areas 
is that households often require signifi cantly more than the six kiloliters 
per month offered for free due to signifi cantly higher numbers of residents 
per household than middle-class suburbs and fi nd themselves paying the 
higher tariff rates, a problem made worse by faulty meters, incorrect meter 
readings and leaky infrastructure in township homes.
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Figure 2
Billing
Cape Town has three main problems with its billing system for water: 
arrears; incorrect metering; and discrepancies in bills sent to households.  
The situation of arrears began in the 1980s when rent boycotts in townships 
were used to undermine the political legitimacy and economic viability 
of Black Local Authorities.  This situation was compounded by ineffi cient 
data bases and billing systems which resulted from the rapid transition of 
state-owned properties being sold to private owners.  Following the 1996 
amalgamation process, the six newly integrated municipal administrations 
began incorporating these areas into a payment system that included an 
interim service community charge.  
The problems with incorporating the BLA areas began with numerous 
bills being sent out to households in these areas refl ecting years of water 
consumption that were previously not billed.  Local authorities sent out 
bills covering consumption between 1993-1997 based on estimations from 
the early 1990s household consumption habits.  These earlier records were 
then used to assess the total amount of arrears owed.  Furthermore, many 
bills were sent to incorrect addresses.  Households in these areas were 
therefore accumulating arrears for non-payment without being aware of it, 
a signifi cant factor in household reluctance to pay these arrears. 
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The Corporatization of Water in Cape Town
In the process of centralizing billing systems and installing meters in BLA 
areas, discrepancies in billing practices within a single township have 
also created resentment and confusion.  For instance, in the township 
of Langa, certain properties are being billed for both interim community 
service charges and metered water consumption while other properties 
are not being billed at all (Parker 2001, 4).  Importantly, it is only in the 
township areas where these bill discrepancies and mistakes have been a 
major problem.
Debt Management and Water Cutoffs
By 1998, a metropolitan-wide practice was in place for cutting off water 
supplies for non-payment of bills and arrears as a debt management 
mechanism.  At the same time, municipal administrations across the CMA 
developed credit control policies whereby service users in arrears were 
invited to make an arrangement with their service provider to begin 
paying off a portion of their debts.  The rigidity of these credit control 
policies varied across the metropole.  The former Cape Town substructure 
introduced a rigid approach to debt management, but this proved to be 
largely ineffective.  For instance, out of 7,323 payment plan arrangements 
made in 2000, 5,201 were not kept after the fi rst installment.  The 
Tygerberg administration, by contrast, developed a more fl exible policy, 
asking residents to pay their current accounts and to contribute what the 
service user deemed affordable towards their arrears. 
But it is water cutoffs that have been the most conspicuous – and 
the most controversial – aspect of debt management strategies in the 
city.  Since the fi rst post-apartheid elections in 1996, an estimated 92,772 
households have had their water cut off for non-payment.  75,400 of these 
cutoffs occurred in the Cape Town and Tygerberg administrations alone 
during 1999 and 2000.20  Of the 5,367 cutoffs occurring in Cape Town 
during these two years the coloured townships were the hardest hit with 
the highest number of cutoffs taking place in Tafelsig, Mitchell’s Plain.21  
During the same period, Tygerberg cut off a total of 70,036 households.  
The apex of these cutoffs occurred in 2000 when the moratorium on 
African households was lifted.  In a six-month period in 2000, 14,355 
cutoffs occurred in Khayelitsha.22 
Whether this cutoff strategy has had an effect on cost recovery rates is 
doubtful given that “inability” to pay appears to be more of a factor than 
“unwillingness” to pay.  Contrary to media reports in Cape Town and 
other parts of the country which tend to portray the arrears issue as a 
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“culture of non-payment”, interviews conducted for this research with 60 
households in Bonteheuwel and Mitchell’s Plain found that an inability to 
pay was the main reason for non-payment in the overwhelming majority 
of households.23  In these cases water cutoffs do little to improve rates of 
cost recovery; they merely serve to aggravate the non-payment situation 
and increase costs to the city in terms of policing and maintenance, as 
the violent demonstrations against water cutoffs in Tafelsig in September 
of 2001 illustrate.24  
Illegal reconnections also serve to negate any potential cost recovery 
gains from cutoffs.   Of the 87,736 cutoffs in Tygerberg between 1996 and 
2001, for example, there were 52,670 illegal reconnections, representing a 
60% illegal reconnection rate and the loss of associated revenue potentials 
(Department of Revenue Collection 2001).   
In short, water cutoffs as a debt management strategy in Cape Town 
have had a controversial and questionable impact on cost recovery.  It 
would appear to be an unsustainable strategy from an administrative 
perspective as it costs the city in both billing and staff time to carry 
out the cutoffs and reconnections and serves to aggravate relations with 
low-income households (witness the high rates of illegal reconnections in 
Tygerburg and the tensions over water cutoffs in Tafelsig).  There is also the 
very real threat of a major health epidemic of the sort that KwaZulu-Natal 
has experienced with cholera.  After municipal and provincial authorities 
in that province introduced new cost recovery measures for water in 
mid-2000, thousands of poor households that could not afford the service 
were either disconnected or unable to connect in the fi rst place and were 
forced to use stagnant ponds and rivers for water and sanitation.  Since 
that time over 100,000 people have been infected with cholera and there 
have been over 250 deaths.  With Cape Town’s high rates of tuberculosis, 
it may be only a matter of time before water cutoffs lead to a similarly 
tragic health crisis.
Outsourcing
When the fi rst democratically elected local administrations came to power 
in 1996 in Cape Town, discussions took place regarding the division 
between core and non-core services.  Non-core services such as catering, 
cutting of verges, road markings and auditing were outsourced.  At the 
same time, some core services, of which water was one, underwent 
a process of unbundling by contracting out aspects of the service to 
entrepreneurs.  For instance, the Cape Town administration contracted out 
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mainlaying and water cutoffs while Tygerberg contracted out construction 
work, a portion of meter installation, meter reading, water cutoffs, 
design for reservoirs, water network analysis (master plans), and water 
infrastructure maintenance such as pipe cleaning.  The bulk of water 
services are still provided by the city, but of the 13 water depots in the 
CMA in mid-2000, all but two reported having outsourced some activities 
and the trend is clearly in the direction of further outsourcing.25  
Corporatizing Water
These commercialization trends in the water sector in Cape Town have been largely ad hoc and uncoordinated, however.  It was not until the proposal to corporatize water in early 2001 that a coherent commercialization strategy began to emerge.  This next section 
defi nes corporatization in general terms, followed by a more detailed 
description of the specifi c water corporatization plans for Cape Town. 
What is Corporatization? 
Corporatization is a process of creating an arm’s length service entity that 
is fully owned and operated by the state but which is ringfenced fi nancially 
and managerially from other services (Shirley 1999, PWC 1999, PDG 
2001).  
As a form of internal reorganization, corporatization involves a two-
pronged approach to the management of public services.  The fi rst aspect 
of reform entails fi nancial ringfencing with the aim of making income 
and expenditures associated with running a service more transparent.  
Ringfencing separates all fi nancial and human resources directly involved 
in the delivery of a particular service from all other service functions.  
Where services are shared by other departments (e.g., information 
technologies or scientifi c services) the ringfenced entity pays a full-cost fee 
for these services.  
Financially, the purpose of ringfencing is to create a transparent form 
of accounting where all costs and revenues related to the service can 
be identifi ed, along with any subsidies in and out of the ringfenced unit.  
This is intended to reveal the real costs/surpluses of running a service 
and to allow managers to identify areas of fi nancial loss/gain that may 
have otherwise been hidden in the intricate accounting systems and cross-
subsidization mechanisms of an integrated service delivery scheme with 
centralized accounting.  Financial ringfencing also creates an opportunity 
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to introduce fi nancially driven performance targets for managers (i.e., 
managers are rewarded for meeting loss/profi t targets).  This approach 
introduces “market-based” salaries for managers with the aim of attracting 
world class executives who will pay their way by ensuring that the bottom 
line is positive.
The second aspect of corporatization is ringfencing a service 
managerially – i.e., creating separate business units that are managed by 
appointed offi cials who operate at arm’s length from the elected offi cials of 
the municipality.  Elected offi cials still have the right to set standards and 
service delivery goals for a service unit, as well as monitor and evaluate 
the activities of the business unit, but the daily management and long-term 
planning of the unit are done by the ringfenced management team.  In 
turn, this management team is responsible only for the unit they work in.  
Although there may be formal or informal links with other service sectors 
(e.g., waste management), and the use of certain centralized support 
centers within council (e.g., IT), managers of a particular business unit are 
expected to concern themselves only with the management of their sector. 
The purpose of this fi nancial and managerial ringfencing, in the words 
of the Steering Committee advising city council in Cape Town on the 
matter, is to create “maximum autonomy and minimum constraints” (CMC 
2001, 2) – i.e., to provide management independence from political 
interference as well as to grant them the authority to make and implement 
service delivery decisions.   
It should also be noted that the process of corporatization does not 
preclude the outsourcing of functions within the newly defi ned business 
units.  Indeed, corporatization promotes outsourcing due to the infusion 
of market principles and the need to improve the fi nancial bottom line.  
A competitive environment, in turn, requires deregulating monopolistic 
control over a given public service and allowing multiple service providers 
to compete with the ringfenced business unit to provide a particular 
service at cost-effective prices26.  The removal of subsidies for instance, 
forces state-owned enterprises to compete for fi nance on an equal basis 
with private fi rms (Shirley 1999, 116).  
Different models of corporatization in South Africa include setting up a 
Section 21 company,27 the creation of a public utility, and a water board.
Cape Town’s Plans for Corporatization
Water corporatization fi rst emerged as a possible service delivery strategy 
in Cape Town in 2000 with proposals by the Unicity Commission to 
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horizontally integrate bulk water and wastewater treatment functions into 
a Section 21 company (Unicity Commission 2000).  Shortly after coming 
to power in the local government elections of December 2000, the 
Democratic Alliance circulated a memo suggesting the corporatization of 
water and sanitation, electricity, and refuse removal by July 1, 2002 with 
a proposal to ringfence each of these services by July 1, 2001.  The model 
put forward involved public utilities with a board of directors that would 
be accountable to council as the sole shareholders (PWC 2000, 6).28 
The aim of the corporatization plan as it currently stands (PWC 2001) 
is to fi rst embark on an internal reorganization of services such as 
information technology, corporate fi nance and human resources in order 
to upgrade centralized support services.  While this internal reorganization 
unfolds, the water and sanitation sectors would proceed with vertical 
and horizontal integration and anchor themselves within government as a 
business unit to facilitate fi nancial and managerial ringfencing.  The same 
sequence of events is being proposed for electricity and refuse collection 
services.  
These utilities would then be able to subcontract support services from 
the newly corporatized support center (e.g., IT, Corporate Finance).  If, after 
three years time, these centralized services are not deemed satisfactory, 
the new utilities would have the freedom to contract alternative service 
providers (i.e., from the private sector).  Finally, it is proposed that a 
regulatory agency composed of elected municipal representatives would 
be established to monitor and evaluate the performance of the utilities 
through pre-defi ned performance criteria.  Figure 3 illustrates the proposed 
framework for transforming these tariff-based services into business units 
(or public utilities as they are being called).
46
Research Series Occasional Papers No.7
Figure 3: Corporatization Model for Cape Town
Concerns with Corporatizing Water in 
Cape Town
This fi nal section of the chapter outlines our concerns with the proposed move to corporatize water and sanitation in Cape Town, with a focus here on water.  Many of the same concerns apply to the proposed corporatization of electricity and solid waste.  Underlying 
all of these concerns is the deepening commercialization of service 
provision in the city and the ramifi cations of making cost recovery the 


















The Corporatization of Water in Cape Town
Fragmented Decision Making
Prior to 1996, the Cape Town metropolitan area was divided into 25 
different municipalities, each with its own water service departments.  
The fi rst round of local government amalgamation in 1996 reduced this 
to six municipal substructures and a metropolitan council (plus several 
separate municipalities which were excluded from the metro area – e.g., 
Stellenbosch).
The creation of a single unicity in December of 2000 brought to an end 
this history of political fragmentation.  However, service delivery remains 
effectively divided along the six substructure lines, with signifi cant divisions 
still remaining even along apartheid-era municipal lines (see Chapter One 
of this publication for a discussion of the continued disparities in municipal 
resources in the water and waste management sectors).  
In some respects this service fragmentation is understandable.  With 
close to 30,000 employees in the metropolitan area, considerable 
bureaucratic resistance to change, and limited resources to effect 
amalgamation, it is not entirely surprising that concrete service delivery 
reorganizations have not kept pace with changes in political boundaries.  
But it is exactly this kind of continued fragmentation and inequitable 
distribution of resources that argues against corporatization.  To carve 
out yet another decision-making unit without a rationalization and 
equalization of existing resources and decision-making functions of the 
various water depots and departments in the new unicity will likely 
exacerbate the fragmented decision-making structures in the water sector 
and make it even more diffi cult to communicate effectively with other 
sectors.  The growing trend towards outsourcing will likely make the 
situation of fragmentation even worse, as a disjointed and uneven 
corporate unit attempts to hire, monitor and evaluate outsourced private 
companies with limited political oversight. 
Price Increases and the Loss of Cross-subsidization
The creation of a ringfenced water and sanitation utility also poses the 
threat of signifi cant increases in water tariffs while at the same time 
reducing the potential for cross-subsidies to poor households.  Water prices 
are currently tariff-based (i.e., based on consumption) while sanitation 
prices are rates based (i.e., part of general property taxes  based on the 
value of one’s home).  Plans to vertically and horizontally integrate these 
two functions into a single utility29 would require removing sanitation 
from the general rates accounts and charging consumers a tariff based 
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on consumption.  The outcome of this ringfencing exercise would be to 
increase the cost of water and sanitation services by 30-50% according 
to one senior manager,30 thus making this essential service all the more 
unaffordable for low-income households in the city.  
The creation of a business unit for water and sanitation would also 
reduce the potential for cross-subsidization from other service sectors, 
most notably electricity which contributes 13.5% of total sales to the 
Rates and General Account “which is then used to cross-subsidize other 
activities of the Council” (PWC 2001, 17).  This is not to suggest that 
cross-subsidization is impossible under corporatized service arrangements. 
But given the stated desire of making business units more fi nancially 
accountable and viable on their own, there is an intrinsic bias against cross-
subsidization.  The fact that the fi nal consultancy report recommending 
the corporatization of services in Cape Town (PWC 2001) does not make 
any reference whatsoever to cross-subsidization mechanisms for water and 
sanitation underscores this point.
The central objective of corporatization, therefore, is to make service 
units fi nancially independent.  Where, then, will the shortfall of some R100 
million per annum in the water sector in Cape Town come from?  As we 
shall see below, it is most likely to come from increased pressures for cost 
recovery and anticipated savings in the form of outsourcing. 
Where Will Cost Savings Come From?
According to the consultants report, cost savings arising from 
corporatization in Cape Town should be in the order of 20-35% per 
business unit based on “international benchmarks”, as follows: 30% from 
rationalizing procurement; 10-60% in personnel savings; and 25-35% 
from the simplifi cation and standardization of fi nancial and administrative 
services (PWC 2001, 9).  Putting aside, for the moment, the question of 
why similar savings in procurement and fi nance/administration could not 
be realized within the existing departmental system, it is worth exploring 
the source of cost savings in personnel under the corporatization proposal. 
Evidently, cost savings are not going to come from the salaries of upper 
management, whose “management skills and experience...appear to be very 
good” – one of the few “pockets of excellence” according to the consultant’s 
report (PWC 2001, 13, 15).  Moreover, it is recommended that remuneration 
systems should “reward excellent performance” (PWC 2001, 11), suggesting 
the possibility of signifi cant salary increases for senior managers, a common 
practice in the international experience of corporatization.  
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Middle managers and supervisors, meanwhile, are viewed less favourably.  
“Concerns about skill levels in the fi eld” (PWC 2001, 13) raise the prospect 
of middle-management downsizing or the possible outsourcing of these 
functions.  The human resources department, for example, “is a question 
mark concerning [its] possible business value” (PWC 2001, 10).  
Labour also appears to be targeted for downsizing.  With a “labour 
surplus in certain areas”, and “counterproductive” labour relations in 
the water sector (PWC 2001, 10, 25), there is the very real threat 
of job losses.  Much of this downsizing would likely come from 
outsourcing given that it “appears unlikely that real benefi ts can be 
obtained from a conventional approach to reducing costs [i.e., wage 
reductions].”  As a result, “alternative service provision mechanisms 
should be evaluated....different ways of procuring and contracting, which 
a Business Unit can provide [i.e., outsourcing]” (PWC 2001, 15).  The 
corporatization of water in Cape Town is intended to set the stage for an 
accelerated programme of outsourcing and it is likely that job losses will 
occur in the public sector.
There is also the likelihood of increased water cutoffs for non-payment 
of services in a bid to reduce the operating defi cit.  With cost 
recovery paramount in a corporatized unit, pressures to remove defaulting 
customers from the system will be considerable, raising the spectre of 
increased violence, public health epidemics (e.g., cholera, tuberculosis), 
worsening race, class and gender divisions, and an increase in non-
payment rates as a form of political protest, potentially undermining any 
cost saving that may have been generated.  The possibility of tariff increases 
of 30-50% under a corporatized system only heightens these concerns.     
Democratic accountability
As noted earlier, the stated rationale for the creation of a separate business 
unit for water services in Cape Town is to create  “maximum autonomy 
and minimum constraints” for managers.  The same theme emerged in 
interviews with senior water managers in the former substructures of Cape 
Town and Tygerberg who cited “political pressures and interference” as 
well as the “ineffi ciencies” and “drawn-out decision-making processes” of 
centralized support services as their primary motivation for a corporatized 
unit.  These managers, as well as the unicity’s Service Delivery Steering 
Committee, believe that a separate business unit would provide them with 
the fl exibility and the authority to pursue the most cost effective ways of 
providing and extending water services to the city.  
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This arm’s length relationship begs the question, however, of how civil 
society will have control over water in the city.  The consultant’s report 
is remarkably silent on this point, noting only that a corporatized water 
unit should “become customer focused” (PWC 2001, 28).  But how exactly 
will citizens engage in the policy-making priorities of the water sector?  
What will happen to the much-vaunted Integrated Development Processes 
(IDPs) that all municipalities are to have in place for citizen involvement 
in holistic decision making on poverty alleviation and other important 
service-dependent objectives?  
How, for that matter, will elected offi cials engage with the 
“autonomous” managers of business units?  It is proposed that a regulatory 
body of some kind would be established to monitor, evaluate and 
guide each of the service delivery business units, but the lack of any 
concrete proposals in the consultant’s report is concerning.  So too is the 
international experience with “independent” bodies that regulate private 
or corporatized service delivery units (see, for example, Mulgan 2000, 
Roberts 2000).  As Cameron (1999, 25) observes, “special-purpose bodies” 
like corporate business units “have problems of accountability.  They tend 
to be appointed and/or indirectly elected and are in most cases removed 
from the realm of political contestation”.  Corporatized business units 
do not want to “expose [themselves] to public embarrassment” or “open 
themselves to the same degree of media interrogation that politicians must 
accept, even on matters of clear public interest” (Mulgan 2000, 94).  
Water, however, is a political issue.  Rather than attempting to extricate 
itself from this political process, water managers should be looking 
for ways to more effectively engage in political decision making and 
public participation.  Questions about block tariff rates, water demand 
management, investments in infrastructure and the distribution of public 
resources are issues that can and should be openly debated in public, not 
behind closed doors by a select group of technocrats. 
Flawed Process 
As noted earlier, the original proposal for corporatization was withdrawn 
due to noncompliance with the Municipal Systems Act.  The process was 
put back on track in mid-2001 with the appointment of a consultant to 
make recommendations to council, but procedural concerns remain.  Of 
greatest concern is the lack of consultation with labour and civil society.  
There have been no public consultations on the proposed corporatization 
of services, while interactions with organized labour have been tense at 
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best and confrontational at worst, as witnessed by the quote cited earlier 
that the plans to corporatize are “a lawful decision of Council and we do 
not have to justify the decisions to the unions”.
The two municipal unions in the CMA (Samwu and Imatu) also 
expressed their “unhappiness with the use of consultants to conduct the 
assessment [of service delivery reforms] and put the position that such 
assessments should be conducted within a holistic restructuring framework” 
(CMC 2001, 9).  In response, the Steering Committee responsible for the 
restructuring process granted the unions “4 full-time shop stewards each, 
1 day per month per ordinary shop steward and 1 day per month per 
member in order to facilitate their participation in the structuring process.  
It was the employer’s view that this time-off would be suffi cient to allow 
the unions to respond as required” (CMC 2001, 12).  Given that the 
union had to respond to the proposals in less than three weeks with little 
internal capacity and no additional resources, the time allocated was in 
fact insuffi cient for a proper response, particularly when compared to the 
time (three months) and money (R203,185) paid to the consultants who 
developed the proposals.   
But even the time and money provided to the consultants could 
scarcely have been suffi cient for such a major restructuring plan.  To 
claim to have completed an analysis of all the “human resource, industrial 
relations, organization design, fi nance, service operational issues and other 
internal issues required to meet the Municipal Systems Act requirements” 
in just three months (with the fi rst draft having been completed in only 
eight weeks) seems remarkable.  While it is true that the consultancy 
fi rm PriceWaterhouseCoopers has been involved in the reorganization 
process in Cape Town for several years and had done previous work 
on the corporatization option, the dearth of reliable information on the 
metropolitan area – as demonstrated by the fact that no metropolitan-wide 
audits on municipal resources have ever been conducted in the city (see 
Chapter One) – brings into question the value of the conclusions.  
One explanation for this extraordinary research speed is methodology. 
With the almost exclusive use of the “Excelsior Diagnostic Improvement 
Tool” – an evaluative mechanism “developed by PriceWaterhouseCoopers 
to assist their global initiative on supporting excellence in the public sector” 
(PWC 2001, 5) – a review of Cape Town’s water, sanitation, electricity 
and waste management services was completed and then evaluated against 
“international best practice” (primarily with cities in Europe and North 
America).  In effect, Cape Town’s services were evaluated on the basis of a 
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quantitative research tool and then compared to corporatized service units 
in Britain, Canada and other highly industrialized nations.  There was no 
analysis of reform options within the existing “departmental model” and 
no discussion of the experience with corporatization in other ‘third world’ 
cities.  That Cape Town, with its highly unique post-apartheid service 
delivery features, should be compared to European and North American 
cities in such a blueprint fashion raises serious questions about the validity 
of the research and its conclusions that cost reductions and effi ciency gains 
can only “become possible if the recommendation to implement Business 
Units is accepted” (CMC 2001, 13).   
Why the research did not encompass a wider range of transformation 
options can only be speculated on, as can the eager support for the 
proposal on the part of the Council’s Steering Committee.  But if the 
analysis in Chapter One of this collection on the shift to neoliberalism in 
service delivery policy-making circles in Cape Town is correct then it is 
arguable that the decision to corporatize was made on an ideological basis 
and perhaps even determined before the consultants began their research. 
It could also be argued that corporatization is a second best option 
for the more strident neoliberal managers and councilors described in 
Chapter One who would prefer to see a more comprehensive privatization 
of water and other core services but who are perhaps unwilling to deal 
with the kind of political pressures that have accompanied privatizations 
elsewhere in the country.  As one senior manager commented in an 
interview, “corporatization is an opportunity to run services leaner, meaner 
and without sweat”.  There is, of course, also the possibility that the 
corporatization of water in Cape Town is merely the fi rst step towards 
outright privatization, as the opening quote in this chapter implies.    
Conclusions
Missing from the proposal for corporatization is an analysis of alternative public sector reforms.  As noted above, the consultants simply compared the status quo to corporatized “best practice” elsewhere in the world with 
no acknowledgement or evaluation of the potential for reform within the 
existing “departmental” system.  
In reality, there is enormous potential for reform of the current 
departmental system.  Severe inequalities and ineffi ciencies still exist 
in the CMA, and there is much that could be done to improve cost 
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savings in procurement and other centralized functions (as per the 
consultant’s report) while retaining the benefi ts of an integrated, holistic 
and politicized structure of decision making.  That these (apparently 
obvious) effi ciency gains have not been achieved after more than 
fi ve years of post-apartheid amalgamation in Cape Town brings into 
question the performance of the upper levels of management that the 
PriceWaterhouseCoopers report praised.
Nor is there any mention in the corporatization proposals of plans to 
request an increase in intergovernmental transfers in an attempt to address 
the ‘unfunded mandates’ of local government or any discussion of more 
signifi cantly increased water tariffs for wealthy households in an attempt to 
better cross-subsidize the poor and reduce wasteful consumption of water 
(up to 35% of which goes into watering suburban gardens (Davies and Day 
1998, 9)).  Decision makers appear to have accepted the status quo with 
respect to fi scal restraints and consumption patterns, with the consultant’s 
report arguing that the city should “keep tariffs as low as possible” (PWC 
2001, 15).  
Finally, it is possible to improve fi nancial transparency and create 
better accountability in the water and sanitation sector without introducing 
market incentives and ringfencing to do so.  Understanding the “real” 
costs of service delivery and the source and value of defi cits/surplus is 
in everybody’s interest.  It is only when these full fi nancial costs are 
understood and accounted for that a transparent and sustainable cross-
subsidization programme can be put in place and evaluated against the 
less tangible costs and benefi ts of service delivery such as improved public 
health, gender equity, improved productivity and racial desegregation.  
Corporatization forces this kind of fi nancial transparency but also limits 
the options available to local government in terms of cross-subsidization 
within and across sectors, minimizes integrated and holistic decision 
making, and reduces the potential for the inclusion of non-fi nancial criteria 
such as public health in more conventional cost-benefi t analyses.  
The challenge in Cape Town is to create a fi nancially transparent water 
and sanitation department that remains politically accountable, engaged 
with civil society, and integrated with other service sectors to ensure a 
more holistic and equitable planning and delivery programme.   
54




Ahmad, Junaid (1995). “Funding the Metropolitan Areas of South Africa,” 
 Finance  and Development September.
ANC (African National Congress) (2000). “ANC Local Government 
 Elections 2000 Manifesto: Together Speeding Up Change, Fighting 
 Poverty and Creating a Better Life for All: The People Shall Govern.” 
 Mimeo.
Bakker, Karen (2000).  “Privatizing Water:  BoTT and Hydropolitics in the 
 New South Africa,” South African Geography Journal 82, no. 1 :  
 3-12.
Batley, Richard (1996). “Public-Private Relationships and Performance in 
 Service  Provision,” Urban Studies 33, no. 4/5: 723-51.
Bond, Patrick (1999). “Basic Infrastructure for Socio-Economic   
 Development, Ecological Sustainability and Geographical  
 Segregation: South African’s Unmet Challenge,” Geoforum 30, 
 no. 1: 43-59.
 (2000). Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South 
 Africa. Durban: University of Natal Press.
Cameron, R. (1999). Democratization of South African Local Government: 
 A Tale of Three Cities. Cape Town: JL van Schaik.
CMC (Cape Metropolitan Council) (2001). “Assessment of Internal 
 Mechanisms for the Provision of Solid Waste, Water and 
 Sanitation, and Electricity Services in Terms of Section 78(1) of 
 the Local Government Municipal Systems Act: Service Delivery 
 Steering Committee,”7 November. Mimeo.
City of Cape Town (2001). Water and Sanitation Tariffs – 2001/2002 Budget 
 Year, Executive Committee Memo, 22 May. Mimeo. 
DA (Democratic Alliance) (2000). “Local Government Manifesto: For All 
 the People.” Mimeo.
56
Research Series Occasional Papers No.7
Davies, B. and J. Day (1998). Vanishing Waters. Cape Town: UCT Press. 
Fiil, M. (2001). The Electricity Crisis in Soweto. MSP Occasional Papers 
 Series No. 1. Cape Town: Municipal Services Project.
Financial and Fiscal Commission (1997). “Local Government in a System 
 of Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa: A Discussion 
 Document” (Midrand). Mimeo.
Gulyani, Sumila. (1999). “Delivery of Financing of Infrastructure Services.” 
 Paper presented at the “City and Urban Management” World Bank 
 conference, 4-15 May, Toronto.
Hawley, S. (2000). “Exporting Corruption: Privatisation, Multinationals and 
 Bribery,” Cornerhouse Briefi ng 19. London: Cornerhouse.
Idasa (2001). E-Politics 3, no. 4 (19 October). 
Institute, Labour Resource and Research. (2000). Public sector restructuring 
 in Namibia – Commercializaton, privatization and  outsourcing 
 – Implications for organized labour. Windhoek: Labour Resource 
 and Research Institute.
Loftus, A. and D. McDonald (2001). “Of Liquid Dreams: A Political 
 Ecology of Water Privatization in Buenos Aires,” Environment and 
 Urbanization 12, no. 2. 
Marais, Hein. (2000), The Limits to Change. Cape Town: Juta Press.
McDonald, D. (2002). “Cost Recovery and the Crisis of Service Delivery in 
 South Africa,” Alternatives 28, no. 3. 
MIIU (Municipal Infrastructure Investment Unit) (2000). Homepage on the 
 World Wide Web, http://www.miiu.org.za/mission.html
MSP (Municipal Services Project) (2000). “Survey of Municipal 




Mulgan, R. (2000). “Comparing Accountability in the Public and Private 
 Sectors,” Australian Journal of Public Administration 59, no. 1: 
 87-97.
Murray, Martin J. (1994). The Revolution Deferred: The Painful Birth of 
 Post-Apartheid South Africa. London: Verso.
O’Meara, Dan (1996). Forty Lost Years: The Apartheid State and the Politics 
 of the National Party 1948-1994. Johannesburg: Ravan Press.
Pape, J. (2001). “Poised to Succeed or Set Up to Fail?: A Case Study of the 
 First Public-public Partnership in Water Delivery,” MSP Occasional 
 Papers Series No. 1. Cape Town: Municipal Services Project.
Parker, Mike. (2000). Proposed policy framework to inform the process 
 of convergence to a common metropolitan-wide tax and tariff 
 structure (DRAFT) commissioned by the Unicity Commission, 
 pp.1-19.
 (2001) City of Cape Town Administration – Unbilled Areas, Draft 
 memorandum, February.
PDG (Palmer Development Group and School of Governance, University 
 of Western Cape). (2001). Corporatization of Municipal Water 
 Service Providers Research Report. Cape Town: Water Research 
 Commission.
Pollock, A. and D. Price. (2000). “Globalization? Privatization!: WTO and 
 Public Services,” Health Matters 41 (Summer). 
PWC (PriceWaterhouseCoopers) (1999).  Corporatization Models for Water 
 and Waste Water Directorates (July). Cape Town: PWC.
 (2000). Feasibility Study :  Water and Wastewater Utility Company. 
 Cape Town: PWC. 
 (2001). “Assessment of Internal Mechanisms for the Provision of 
 Solid Waste, Water and Sanitation, and Electricity Services for the 
 City of Cape Town: Executive Summary,” 29 October. Mimeo. 
58
Research Series Occasional Papers No.7
Qotole, Msokoli, Mthetho Xali and Franco Barchiesi. (2001). “The 
 Commercialisation of Waste Management in South Africa,” MSP 
 Occasional Papers Series No. 3. Cape Town: Municipal Services 
 Project.
Queensland Government. (1992). Corporatization in Queensland:  Policy 
 guidelines.  White paper.  Brisbane: Government Owned 
 Enterprises Unit, Treasury.
 (1997). National Competition Policy Implementation in   
 Queensland: Full-Cost Pricing, pp.1-24.
Roberts, A.S. (2000). “Less Government, More Secrecy: Reinvention and 
 the Weakening of Freedom of Information Law,” Public 
 Administration Review 60, no.4 (July/August.
RSA (Republic of South Africa) (1995). “Municipal Infrastructure 
 Investment Framework,” Ministry in the Offi ce of the President and 
 the Department of National Housing, 12 June. Mimeo.
 (1998). “The Municipal Structures Act, No. 117.” Pretoria: 
 Government Printers.
 (2000a). “Local Government: Municipal Systems Act, 2000 
 Pretoria: Government Printers.
 (2000b). “Draft: Local Government: Property Rates Bill.”  Pretoria: 
 Government Printers.
 (2000c). The White Paper on Municipal Service Partnerships. 
 Pretoria: Government Printers.
 (2000d). “Municipal Infrastructure Investment Framework (MIIF): 
 Draft,” Department of Provincial and Local Government, February. 
 Mimeo.
Sexton, S, (2001). “Trading Health Care Away?: GATS, Public Services And 
 Privatisation,” Cornerhouse Briefi ng 23 London: Cornerhouse
59
 
Shirley, M. (1999).  “Bureaucrats in Business:  The Roles of Privatization 
 versus Corporatization in State-Owned Enterprise Reform,” World 
 Development 27, no. 1.
Smith, D. M. (ed.) (1992).  The Apartheid City and Beyond: Urbanization 
 and Social Change in South Africa. London: Routledge.
Swilling, Mark, William Cobbett and Roland Hunter. (1991) “Finance, 
 Electricity costs, and the Rent Boycott,” in Apartheid City in 
 Transition, Richard Humphries, Khehla Shubane and Mark Swilling 
 (eds.) Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
Swilling, M., R. Humphries and K. Shubane (eds.) (1991).  Apartheid City in 
 Transition Cape Town: Oxford University Press.
Unicity Commission (2000). “Discussion Document: Developing the 
 Future City of Cape Town,” August. Mimeo.
World Bank (1994). World Development Report 1994: Infrastructure for 
 Development. New York: Oxford University Press.
60
Research Series Occasional Papers No.7
Endnotes
1  It is diffi cult to identify any trends in attitudes in terms of race and gender, due 
in large part to the fact that the sample was overwhelmingly white (79%) and 
male (93%), itself a telling feature of the senior echelons of decision making in 
Cape Town.  
2  The Unicom was established in November of 1999 as a temporary research and 
political body designed to oversee the transition from the seven local authorities to 
a single metropolitan government (the “unicity”) in the December 2000 elections.
3  All references in this section refer to the Unicity Commission (2000a). Section 
numbers are provided because the document does not have page numbers.
4  No page numbers provided in the document.
5  For example, over 300 Samwu offi cials “illegally” occupied the Unicom offi ces 
in November of 2000, toyi-toying in the offi ces and on the streets, demanding 
better representation in the Unicom deliberations.  There were also tense stand-offs 
over strike action, with the Unicom interdicting the union’s attempts to be in a legal 
strike position.  Although interdicted once, the union did manage a one-day strike 
in early December of that year over a unilateral decision taken by the Unicom on 
staff placements after amalgamation.
6  A copy was made available to the author of this report only after repeated 
requests.
7  Ebrahim Rasool, leader of the Western Cape provincial ANC, as quoted in Cape 
Argus, December 13, 2000.  
8  For example, Peter Marais, former unicity mayor, was quoted in 1999 saying 
that the NNP “must provide services to the people who were destroyed through 
apartheid. We must move away from pure capitalism and endorse socialist 
principles and the state to help those who are destitute and poor whether they are 
blacks or coloureds” (Mail & Guardian, August 20, 1999).  The majority of Marais’ 
public statements on service policy have been more neoliberal in their orientation, 
however, as witnessed by his remark that poor people could “work off their [service 
payment] arrears [by] cutting grass, removing refuse, painting or doing any other 
work to work off their debts.  If I got R1-million worth of free labour, I could offset 
the arrears and possibly people could get credits if they continue to work once they 
have paid off their debts” (Southern Suburbs Tatler, November 23, 2000).
9 Youth Summit on Privatization, Gugulethu (Cape Town), November 12, 2000, 
organized by the Alternative Information and Development Centre (AIDC).
10  Southern Suburbs Tatler, December 6, 2000.
11  Data collected from the Departments of Billing and Accounts in Tygerberg 
(Belleville offi ce) and the city of Cape Town and are based on the PROMIS 
software system used by these municipalities.  Water cutoffs began in 1998, 
however, suggesting even higher total cutoffs.  Research conducted by the authors 
in July 2000, based on detailed questionnaires sent to every water depot in the 
metropolitan area and representing cutoffs from the previous fi scal year (1998-99) 
are as follows: Cape Town – 9000; Khayelitsha – 5000; Durbanville – 100; 
Goodwood – 0; Delft – 1000; Belleville – 100; Parrow – 2000; Helderberg – 
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6000; Atlantis – 600; Killarney – 3872; Kleinvlei – (no response); Scottsdeme – 
6000; Southern Peninsula Municipality (SPM) – 900.  Note: It is not known what 
percentage of these fi gures represent repeat cases where households have had their 
water supply cut more than once.
12  The former City of Cape Town did have a lifeline water tariff in place by only 
charging 50 cents per kilolitre (kl) for the fi rst six kl.  This was augmented in early 
2001 to R1.08 in order to develop a uniform tariff with other substructures that 
had much higher rates and reduced to zero in mid-2001 when the free lifeline 
tariff was introduced (under a DA government).  The point still remains, however, 
that thousands of households had their water cut off for non-payment under ANC-
controlled councils.
13  Similar wording is to be found in the Water Services Act (section 19 (2)) 
from 1997. 
14  Surveys on capital, human and fi nancial resources were sent to each of the 33 
waste depots and 13 water depots in the CMA, with the approval and knowledge 
of the relevant municipal authorities.  Depot managers completed the surveys 
and sent them back within one month.  Some follow-up clarifi cations were 
conducted telephonically.  All water and waste depots participated in the 
surveys, as follows.  Water: Cape Town, Khayelitsha, Durbanville, Goodwood, 
Delft, Bellevillle, Parrow, Helderberg, Atlantis, Killarney, Kleinvlei, Scottsdeme, 
South Peninsula Municipality; Waste: Sea Point, CBD, Woodstock, Nightwork, 
Bontheheuwel, Athlone, Guguletu North, Guguletu South, Nyanga, Claremont, 
Mowbray, Maitland, Langa, Eastridge, Westridge, Browns Farm, Strand, Atlantis, 
Killarney, Kraaifontein, Kuilsriver, Brackenfell, Meltonrose, Wynberg, Simonstown, 
Muizenberg, Schaapkraal, Khayelitsha, Delft, Parow, Durbanville, Bellville, 
Goodwood. 
15  In some cases depot managers only provided fi gures for the number of 
households serviced.  In order to obtain per capita fi gures we multiplied the 
number of households by three for suburban areas and by fi ve for township areas, 
as per standard statistical practice in South Africa, order to give a truer indication 
of the distributional fi gures.  The fi gures provided here are also adjusted for 
the percent of resources that are used for industrial waste management, as per 
the fi gures provided by the depot manager.  It is worth noting that depots 
reporting signifi cant proportions of their resources being used for commercial 
activity were also in suburban-oriented areas, indicating an even higher potential 
use of resources for domestic waste management activity in these areas.
16  Interview conducted with the author.  
17   Interview with Roger Ronnie, General Secretary of Samwu, March 15, 2001.
18  Interviews were conducted with 25 government offi cials including Executive 
Directors of Water Services, water managers and civil engineers working in the 
water departments of Cape Town, Tygerberg and CMC administrations as well as 
consultants whose area of expertise were relevant to the research.  These semi-
structured interviews focused  on: 1) challenges in expanding service delivery to 
the urban poor; 2) how notions of effi ciency and equity have evolved in relation 
to service delivery since 1997;  3) the strengths and weakness of corporatization; 
and 4) perceptions of the value of public participation in decisions regarding water 
provision. 
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19 Four townships were selected from within the Tygerberg (Khayelitsha and 
Bonteheuwel) and Cape Town (Langa and Mitchell’s Plain) municipal substructures 
representing both African and coloured communities.  Neighbourhoods were then 
selected according to the level of water service (standpipe, yard tap and in-house 
connection).  In Langa these were Settler’s Way (in-house) and hostels (yard tap) 
and the informal settlement of Joe Slovo (standpipe).  In Khayelitsha the township 
areas were Elitha Park (in-house access), Maccassar (yard tap areas) and the 
informal settlement of Monwabisi Park (standpipe access).   In Bonteheuwel, the 
township areas were the center of Bonteheuwel (in-house connections), Vetreg 
(in-house connections) and Kalksteenfontein (yard taps).  In Mitchell’s Plain, 
the township areas were Tafelsig (in-house connections), Westridge (in-house 
connections) and Freedom Park (standpipes).
20  Figures represent a combination of data collected from the Departments of 
Billing and Accounts in Tygerberg (Belleville offi ce) and the city of Cape Town, and 
research conducted by the authors in July 2000 based on detailed questionnaires 
sent to every water depot in the metropolitan area and representing cutoffs from 
the previous fi scal year (1998-99).  Note: It is not known what percentage of these 
fi gures represent repeat cases where households have had their water supply cut 
more than once.
21 Most African households that fell within the IKAPA area were spared cutoffs 
during this period as the area was not yet fully metered.  
22 In Khayelitsha, of 40,000 erven, 25,000 meters are billed according to 
volumetric consumption while the other 20,000 are charged a fl at monthly rate 
of R28.16.
23  Similar reasons were found in a survey of 200 homes in Soweto which had had 
their electricity cut off for non-payment of service (Fiil 2001). 
24 The city council was attempting to cut off the water supplies of 800 homes 
but were met with a large crowd from the community attempting to prevent the 
cutoffs from taking place.  After physical interactions between the crowd and the 
private security fi rm hired to conduct the cutoffs the police opened fi re with what 
they claim were rubber bullets but community representatives claim included live 
bullets.  At least eight people were wounded in the scuffl e and taken to hospital. 
25  Data from a survey conducted by the authors in July-August of 2000. 
26 Although water is a highly monopolistic service, it consists of numerous different 
components that can be transformed into business units to compete with the private 
sector or are directly outsourced.
27  A section 21 company is classifi ed as a non-profi t public company that submits 
fi nancial statements to a Registrar of Companies on an annual basis (PWC 2000, 3). 
28 As the company expanded it was envisioned that it would be able to involve 
equity partners to raise money on the open market.  
29 Vertical integration would involve the merger of the bulk distribution and 
reticulated services while horizontal integration would merge water and wastewater 
activities. 
30 Interview with Arthur Clayton, Executive Director of the Water and Sanitation 
Department for the Cape Metropolitan Council (April 2001).
